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RECASTING PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION
ROBERT L. MISNER*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Decision-making in the criminal justice system at the state level is
entrusted to a myriad of elected and appointed officials who often act
independently of one another. The great majority of the decisions
made by the various officials are effectively unreviewable either
through judicial or administrative processes.' In theory, the electorate holds decision-makers responsible for their actions. However, because of the current diffusion of responsibility, the electorate cannot
easily scrutinize the actions of any one official or hold that official
independently accountable for the successes or failures of the entire
system. In fact, no one is currently held accountable for the successes
or failures of the criminal justice system. One result of the diffusion
of responsibility is that citizens do not believe that the criminal justice
system is responsive to their needs. 2 Citizens do not feel safe despite
* Professor of Law, Willamette University. BA., 1968, University of San Francisco.
J.D., 1971, University of Chicago. The author wishes to thankJeffrey Standen for his comments on an earlier draft. The author is indebted to the Willamette Faculty Study Group
for helpful suggestions. Antonio Comes and Timothy Larson served ably as research
assistants.

I See infra part lII.B.
2 A December 1993 study by the Gallup Poll projects that 38% of Americans frequently
fear that they, or someone in their family, will be sexually assaulted, 35% frequently fear
home burglaries, and 19% frequently fear being murdered. BuREAu oFJUSTCE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTnCE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STAMTIcS 1993, at 182 (Kathleen

Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1994). The public consensus is that crime is escalating.
For over two decades, a majority of respondents in national surveys conducted by the Gallup Poll have indicated that they feel that there is more crime in their neighborhoods
today than one year ago, id at 185, and 42% of survey respondents feel less safe today when
outside of their homes as compared to one year ago. Id. at 184. Fear of violent crime is
especially prevalent among children. A 1993 survey by Louis Harris and Associates of children in grades four through twelve reported that 54% of children frequently worry about
crime, id. at 217, and 22% of students fear for their personal safety at school. IR/ at 218.
Fear of victimization generally leads to significant behavior modifications. In 1993,
the Gallup Poll reported that 43% of survey respondents installed special locks, 40%
avoided walking alone at night in their own neighborhoods, 38% kept a dog for protection, 30% purchased a gun, 27% carried a weapon, and 18% installed a burglar alarm in
response to perceived needs for greater self-protection from crime. Id. at 193.
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the fact that the rate of imprisonment has skyrocketed nationally in
3
the past ten years.
In the past thirty years, the diffusion of responsibility has begun
to abate and power has increasingly come to rest in the office of the
prosecutor. Developments in the areas of charging, plea bargaining,
and sentencing have made the prosecutor the preeminent actor in the
system. 4 The centralization of authority in the prosecution is a development necessary for a coordinated and responsive criminal justice
system in which the prosecutor will ultimately be held accountable to
the voters for the successes and failures of the system.
Previous practices which gave to each sentencing judge the authority to determine sentencing policy on an ad hoc basis through indeterminate sentences, open-ended sentencing statutes, and
uncontrolled parole eligibility resulted in unacceptable sentencing
disparities, overcrowded prisons, and indiscernible sentencing policies, with no apparent impact upon the crime rate. 5 The individualSurveys in recent years show a growing public concern about violent crime. The Gallup Poll reported that 37% of survey participants in aJanuary 1994 survey responded that
crime was the most important problem facing the country. Id. at 154. In the prior 13
years, no more than 9% of survey respondents identified crime as the most important
problem facing the country. Id at 154. For over 14 years, however, the national consensus
has been that too little is spent on crime prevention. Id. at 178.
The public perceives drug abuse, the unwillingness of parents to discipline their children, poverty, the availability of guns, and a general decline in morality as some of the
main causes of violent crime. Id. at 175.
3 The overall incarceration rate per 100,000 population in the United States rose
186% from 1973 to 1990, while the total number of prison inmates rose 238%. UNITED
STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE ROLE OF GENERAL
GOVERNMENT ELECTED OFFICIALS 9-10 (1993) [hereinafter U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS].
4 See infra part III.B.2. The role of discretion in the administration of criminal justice
has been the subject of an enormous body of legal literature. See, e.g., KENNETH CULP
DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of ProsecutorialDiscre-

tion, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981). Much of the writing discusses the role of the prosecutor in plea bargaining. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines A
PleaforLess Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901 (1991) [hereinafter Alschuler, The Failureof
Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation];Albert W. Alschuler, Departures and Plea
Agreements Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 117 F.R.D. 459 (1988); Albert W. Alschuler, Plea
Bargainingand Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1979) [hereinafter Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History];Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in PleaBargaining 36 U. Ci. L.
REV. 50 (1968) [hereinafter Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining]; Donald G.
Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining:The Control of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 1983 U.
ILL. L. REv. 37; Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor'sDiscretion in the United States, 18 AM. J.
COMP. L. 532 (1970); StephenJ. Schulhofer, CriminalJusticeDiscretionin a Regulatory System,
17J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1988) [hereinafter Schulhofer, CiminalJusticeDiscretion in a Regulatory System]; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea BargainingInevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037
(1984) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Is Plea BargainingInevitable ];Jeffrey Standen, PleaBargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines,81 GAL. L. REV. 1471 (1993).
5 See infrapart III.B.2.b. In response to these and similar criticisms, Congress adopted
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as
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ized sentencing policies of various judges cannot be woven into a
single policy of law enforcement. 6 Because courts cannot mold an effective system of law enforcement, and because legislatures are unsuited to the daily implementation of broad policy, the time has come
to encourage prosecutors to fashion local policies of law enforcement
to suit the current needs of their communities. But before there can
be responsible policy-making by the prosecutor, the prosecutor must
be made responsible for the efficient use of finite prison resources.
The current flaw in the evolving power of the prosecutor is the
failure to force.her to face the full cost of prosecutorial decisions. In
mostjurisdictions, county prosecutors use local funds to operate their
offices and therefore, prosecutors must be concerned about the cost
of prosecution.7 But because prisons are operated with state funds,8
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1994)). The Act has been roundly criticized and has itself
generated much discussion, some of which has occurred during symposia: Symposium, A
Decade of Sentencing Guidelines: Revisiting the Role of the Legislature, 28 WAxE FoREST L. REv.
181 (1993); F. Hodge O'Neal Corporate dnd Securities Law Symposium: CorporateSentencing, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 189 (1993); FederalSentencing GuidelinesSymposium, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 771
(1992); Symposium, Making Sense of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 25 U.C. DAVIS L REv.
563 (1992); Symposium, Punishment, 101 YALE UJ. 1681 (1992); Sentencing Symposium 27
AM. CRiM. L. REv. 231 (1989); Symposium on FederalSentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 99 (1992);
A Symposium on SentencingReform in the States, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 645 (1993) (a comparison
of state and federal sentencing reforms). Federal judges have often been outspoken in
their criticism of the federal guidelines. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM'N., JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMISSION, 133-43
(1990). States have also adopted sentencing reforms to meet these criticisms. See, e.g., Kay
A. Knapp & Denis J. Hauptly, State and FederalSentencing Guidelines: Apples and Oranges, 25
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 679 (1992) (arguing that state sentencing reforms are more creative
and more likely to be successful than their federal counterpart); Frederick A. Hussey &
Stephen P. Lagoy, The Impact of Determinate Sentencing Structures, 17 CRIM. L. BULL. 197
(1981) (analyzing state sentencing reforms).
6 With little statutory guidance and virtually no appellate review, sentencingjudges
in mostjurisdictions have been left to themselves to decide what facts about a crime or
a criminal are at all relevant to a sentence, and how those facts ought to affect sentence length. As a consequence, judges have been able--indeed they have virtually
been forced-to sentence on the basis of their own philosophy of criminal law.
Peter B. Pope, How UnreliableFacifindingCan Undermine Sentencing Guidelines, 95 YALE LJ.
1258, 1258-59 (1986) (foomotes omitted). See also Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 413 (1992).
7 One of the early in-depth studies of the duties of the prosecutor came as part of the
American Bar Foundation's Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in the United
States. In FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION:

THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WvITH

CRIME (1969), Professor Miller discussed plea bargaining:
Careful allocation of limited enforcement resources is most dramatically reflected in
current administration practice of making concessions to induce pleas of guilty. Commonly referred to as "bargaining for guilty pleas," the encouragement of such pleas in
the interest of efficiency in administering the system is common in the United States.
Id. at 191-92 (footnotes omitted). Local funding (from county or city sources) accounts for
more than 90% of prosecution costs nationally. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED
STATES DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS 3 (1993). See infra note 128 and
accompanying text.
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effecting a "split-funding" of the criminal justice system, most prosecutors need not directly consider the availability of prison space or
prison resources when making charging, bargaining, or sentencing
decisions.
The result extends beyond the status quo of overcrowded prisons
and ever-bloating prison budgets. The result is a system in which the
local prosecutors effectively dictate the level of spending that the state
legislature must maintain. It is the prosecutor who is most instrumental in determining the number of new prisoners who must be housed
in state prisons. If the legislature refuses to write a blank check for
the prison system, often the prisons must release persons who have
not completed their sentences 9 to make way for new prisoners or face
the threat of federal court intervention.' 0 The release of prisoners
through the backdoor has resulted in an increase in the number of
persons who are returned to prison after release."' The backdoor release policy is also apparently a source of great consternation for the
public.12

As a result, the electorate does not have one official to whom it
can look for leadership. Furthermore, the prosecutor has little incentive to create prosecutorial guidelines, to become an active participant
in crime prevention programs, or to find less costly means of
punishment.
The thrust of this Article is to attempt to find a mechanism for
tying the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to the availability of
prison resources. Because of the great variations in the size, complexity, and state constitutional and statutory bases of prosecutors' authority from state to state, 13 implementing details of any proposal are
unlikely to be wholly uniform. However, for many jurisdictions, particularly large urban jurisdictions, it is possible to outline a general
proposal: a state agency must make a determination of the amount of
prison space available for the upcoming fiscal year. Based upon past
practices, demographic projections, and other relevant factors, available prison resources will be allocated to each prosecutor for use dur8 See infra note 54.
9 UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,

supranote

3, at 10-15.
10 Federal court decrees have ordered changes to be made in the prison systems of 45
states. See id. at 2.
11 "As a percentage of all admissions, those returning to prison after a conditional release has increased from 17% to 29.5%." UNITED STATES DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supranote 7, at

7.
12

See Kay A. Knapp, Allocation of Discretionand Accountability Within SentencingStructures,

64 U. COLO. L. Ruv. 679, 688 (1993).
13 See infra part IILA2.
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ing the next year. Through charging decisions, plea bargains, and
sentence recommendations, the prosecutor will set criminal law enforcement policy within the local jurisdiction in order to make the
most effective use of the resources allocated to the prosecutor's office.
If the prosecutor uses fewer resources than allocated, the savings
would be disbursed to the county. If the prosecutor requires more
resources than allocated, the county must use local funds to purchase
additional prison space either from the state or another jurisdiction.
It will be incumbent upon the prosecutor, with the assistance of the
state allocation agency, to collect data and justify the use of resources
to the electorate. The electorate must then decide whether the prosecutor's enforcement policy and use of resources have met the demands of the people. It is hoped that the responsibility centered in
the prosecutor will make for a more enlightened review by the voters.
This proposal, which retains the clear historical preference for
local control of crime enforcement, 14 will not necessarily lead to fewer
prosecutions or smaller prison populations. The proposal returns
budget choices to the state legislature while making the local prosecutor more responsible to the electorate. However, the proposal does
not require the abandonment of current attempts at sentencing reform, such as sentencing guidelines. In fact, the proposal requires a
high degree of certainty in sentencing-the prosecutor must be able
to predict what a conviction will cost in terms of available prison resources. Sentencing reform, to date, has served to channel the discretion of judges and releasing agencies such as parole boards, but
sentencing reform has not attempted to guide prosecutorial discretion. The proposal accomplishes prosecutorial control through a mix
of financial accountability and voter review.
Once the mechanism for tying the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to the availability of state prison resources has been created,
other changes might be forthcoming. For example, once the prosecutor has the incentive to develop precise guidelines for the operation
of the office, the state legislature may deem it appropriate for local
prosecutors to create the guidelines for state administrative rule-making procedures that afford an opportunity for public comment and
discussion. Prosecutors may become more creative in developing programs to strike at the core roots of crime and center on issues of crime
prevention if it becomes economically and politically expedient to do
so. The results of these experiences might be shared from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction.
This Article first presents a snapshot of crime and sentencing in
14

Id.
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the United States in order to emphasize that the economic stakes require a more responsible process for making public policy choices in
these areas. The discussion then turns to a description of the offices
of the local prosecutor with an emphasis on the preeminent role that
the prosecutor has assumed in the criminal justice system. Criticism
levelled at the office of the prosecutor has accomplished very little.
The time has come to accept the fact that the due process approach of
ordering prosecutorial discretion has little support, as witnessed by
the breadth of discretion permitted to the prosecution by both the
judicial and legislative branches of state governments. Consistency
and fairness are more likely to result from economic restraints and
voter review than any attempt to place judicial controls upon the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Therefore, in the final section, this
Article proposes an outline for tying the exercise of prosecutorial discretion directly to the availability of prison resources.
II.

REALTY AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF CRIME

The detection, prosecution, and punishment of crime is an expensive business. In 1992, more than 16,000 city, county, and state
law enforcement personnel' 5 reported that 14,438,191 "crime index
offenses" had been committed in theirjurisdictions. 16 These agencies
reported a 21% overall clearance rate-a rate that has remained constant for the last ten years.' 7 Approximately 2.9 million arrests were
made by these law enforcement agencies in 1992.18
In March 1993, the United States Department of Justice published its analysis of sentencing in state courts for 1990, noting that
state courts reported 829,344 felony convictions for that year, up from
583,000 in 1986.19 The convictions resulted in 46% of persons con15 U.S. DEP'T OFJusTcIE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1992 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1
(1993). The Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR) of the United States Department
of Justice:
is a nationwide, cooperative statistical effort of over 16,000 city, county, and state law
enforcement agencies voluntarily reporting data on crimes brought to their attention.
During 1992, law enforcement agencies active in the UCR Program represented over
242 million United States inhabitants or 95 percent of the total population as established by the Bureau of the Census.
Id.
16 Id at 5. Seven crimes make up the "Crime Index Offenses": murder, non-negligent
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor
vehicle theft. L

17 Id. at 6.
18 Id.
19 BuREAu OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEP'T. OF JuSTICE, BULLETIN: FELONY

SENTENCES INSTATE COURT, 1990, at 1, 2 (1993). The publication reports sentencing data
from the 1990 National Judicial Reporting Program which is a biennial collection of data
from a sample of felony trial courts in 300 counties. Its purpose is to provide national
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victed sentenced to prison, 25% sentenced to jail usually for a year or
less, and 29% sentenced to probation. 20 In 1986, drug traffickers accounted for 13% of all felony convictions in state courts. By 1990 that
number had grown to 20% of all state felony convictions. 2 ' The percentage of drug trafficking convictions receiving a state prison sentenced increased from 37% in 1986 to 49% in 1990.22 But increases
in prison populationwere not solely due to increased numbers of convicted drug traffickers. The number of arrests for crimes of sexual
assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and burglary rose 34% from 1980
to 1992, and the rate of incarcerations for those convicted increased
from 128 per 1,000 arrests in 1980 to 148 per 1,000 arrests in 1992.23
The average prison sentence for all felons in 1990 was six and a quarter years with the likelihood that the person would actually serve
24
about two years in prison.
Of those convicted of a felony in 1990, 91% pled guilty and 9%
were found guilty at trial,2 Males accounted for 86% of all convicted
felons, 26 whose average age was twenty-nine. 27 Using racial categories
defined by the United States Department ofJustice, 52% of convicted
felons were white, 47% were black and 1% were other races. 28
Large, urban communities in 1980 contained 37% of the nation's
population but accounted for half of all crime reported to police, half
of all felony arrests, and half of all state court felony convictions. 29
From 1986 to 1990, the annual growth rate of felony convictions in
large, urban communities grew a surprising 61%.30 In these communities courts processed cases more quickly in 1990 than in 1986, deestimates of the types of sentences imposed after conviction.
The 1990 survey was based on a sample of 300 counties selected to be nationally representative. The sample consisted of the same jurisdictions as in the 1988 survey and
included the District of Columbia and at least one county from every State except, by
chance, Vermont. Among sampled counties, two sentenced no felons during 1990.
The 1990 survey excluded Federal courts and those state or local courts that did not
adjudicate felony cases. The 1990 survey included only offenses that state penal codes
defined as felonies.

Id. at 2.
20 Id. at 2.
21 Id. at 1.
22 Id.
23 See, BuFAu oF JuSTIcE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTIcE, BULLETIN: PIUSONERS IN
1993 8 (1994) [hereinafter PiusoNERs].
24 Id. at 4.
25 Id. at 1.
26 Id. at 5.

27 I& at 6.
28 I& at 5-6.
29 Id at 7.
30 Id.
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spite the increased volume. 3 ' In 1990 the average time from arrest to
sentencing was 199 days, down from an average processing time of
220 days in 1986.32

Not surprisingly, increases in the number of crimes, the number
of reported crimes, and the rate of incarceration of offenders has increased the demands made upon state prisons. In 1993 the number
of prisoners under the jurisdiction of state correctional authorities was
948,881, which represented an increase of 7% over 1992.33 The incar-

ceration rate of state prisoners in 1993 was 351 prisoners per 100,000
inhabitants, compared to a rate of 139 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants in 1980.34 Regionally, the south has the highest incarceration

rate3 5 -the four states with the highest incarceration rates are Texas,
followed by Oklahoma, Louisiana and South Carolina. 36 Remarkably,
one out of every 181 Texans is in a Texas prison, and this does not
account for additional numbers of Texans serving jail time or under
sentences of parole or probation.3 7 California has the largest number
of inmates-almost 120,000 in 1993.38 The states of Washington,

Texas, New Hampshire and Connecticut had increases in prison population from 1988 to 1993 that exceeded 70%.39 The United States
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations attempted, as
one of its tasks, to determine the factors which have influenced the
dramatic rise in the rate of incarcerated persons: why does the United
States have the highest incarceration rate in the world? 40 From 1925
to 1974, the "annual increase in the proportion of the U.S. population
in prison was 0.5%." 4 1 From 1974 to 1985, the increase grew to 6.2%
per year. From 1986 to 1990 the growth rate increased even higher to
7.9% per year. 42 While the overall incarceration rate increased
186.3% from 1973 to 1990, 43 the total number of prison inmates rose
238.2%. 4 4
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at
34 Id. at

1.
2.

35 Id
36 Id at 4.
37 Id.
38

Id.

39 Id.
40 UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supranote
3, at 1-2. By contrast, in 1990 the United States incarceration rate for all prisons and jails
was 426 per 100,000 population. In the United Kingdom the rate was 97, in France the
rate was 81, and in Denmark the rate was 68. Id.
41 Id. at 10.
42 Id
43 Id.
44 Id
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In its conclusion, the Advisory Committee found that population
growth and increases in reported crime accounted for approximately
25% of the increase in the number of inmates. Changes in arrest policies, such as drug and drunk driving arrests, accounted for a 5% increase. More than 60% of the growth in prison population was
attributable to changes in prosecutorial decisions and judicial decisions to incarcerate persons who previously would not have been incarcerated. Although arrests increased by 76% from 1973 to 1989, the
number of convicted persons sentenced to prison increased by
221%.45 Clearly, changes in sentencing laws, such as mandatory sentencing and sentencing guidelines, played a major role in their dramatic increase.
In addition to population growth and increased reported crime,
the Advisory Committee found that the increase in the length of
prison sentences and the increase in the rate at which conditional release violators were returned to prison also affected the growth in
prison populations. The Advisory Committee determined that 7.1%
of the growth of prison populations from 1974 to 1990 was attributable to inmates serving longer sentences of incarceration. During this
same period, prisons were often faced with federal court orders limiting the number of prisoners who could be held in a particular institution. Many states were forced to release prisoners by such methods as
increasing "good time" credits or by providing for emergency release
policies in order to meet the court ordered prison population restrictions.46 The "back-end" measures of release have been controversial,
apparently for good reason. As the Bureau ofJustice Statistics of the
United States Department ofJustice reported in a study conducted in
1994:
Since 1977 the relative sizes of the two principal sources of admissions to
prison-court commitments and returned conditional release violators-have changed. Court commitments account for a decreasing
share of all prison admissions: 69.5%, down from 82.4% in 1980. As a
percentage of all admissions, those returning to prison after a conditional release increased from 17.0% to 29.5%. 4 7
The reason for the five-fold growth from 1980 to 1992 in the absolute
number of release violators returned to prison is not clear. The
number may suggest that prison populations are justifiably highthere are not large numbers of prisoners who need not be incarcerated yet who have been released because of prison population caps.
On the other hand, it may suggest that the release criteria used to
45

Id at 10-15.

46 1&
47 PiusoNESm, supra note 23, at 7.
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determine early release are faulty-the "wrong" prisoners are released. It may also suggest that prison has a criminogenic effect upon
persons who should not have been incarcerated in the first instance or
that parole officers are more diligent as they supervise the lives of
early release prisoners.
By 1993, increases in the rate of incarceration translated into an
average of 1,056 new inmates arriving each week at state prisons. 48
Already overburdened prisons have gasped at the additional strain.
Based upon the Department of justice "operational capacity" standard, in 1993, forty-two states and the federal prison system reported
inmate population at 100% or more of capacity. 4 9 State prisons as a
whole "were estimated to be operating at 118% of their highest capacities."5 0 Since overcrowding of state prisons is usually the primary
cause behind federal court intervention into state prison operations, it
is not surprising that forty-five out of the fifty state prison systems have
operated under some form of federal court decree. 5 ' It has also been
estimated that 25% of all local jails housing more than 100 prisoners
are under federal court decrees. 52 One researcher has found that
thirteen states have emergency overcrowding legislation which permits the release of prisoners when prison populations exceed speci53
fied levels.
The increased rate of incarceration has wreaked havoc with state
and local budgets. Between 1970 and 1990 "spending on corrections
increased faster than any other area of public spending. 54 Spending
increases for corrections has greatly outpaced spending increases for
police, courts, and community programs. For example, over the period of 1971-1990, corrections spending increased in constant dollars
per capita by 154%, whereas increases for legal services and prosecution increased 152%, courts by 58%, and police by only 16%. 55 The
United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
reported that the brunt of additional costs has been bome mainly by
the counties and the states. The Advisory Committee reported that
48 I& at 4.
49 Id. at 6-7.

50 Id. at 7.
51 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supranote 3, at 2. See
Penelope Lemov, Taking Your Prison Back From the Feds, 6 GOVERNING 22 (1993).
52 U.S. ADVIsoRy COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supranote 3, at 2. It
is estimated that one-third of the 500 largest local jails are under court supervision. See also
Lemov, supra note 51, at 22.
53 Bradford J. Tribble, Note, Prison Overcrowdingin Alaska" A Legislative Response to the
Clear Settlement, 8 ALASKA L. REv. 155, 167-68 (1991).

54 BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS,

EMPLOYMENT 1990, at 1 (1993).
55 Id. at 4-5.

AND
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although, on average, state per capita spending on corrections remains low ($83 per capita in 1990) when compared with such governmental functions as education ($934 per capita in 1990),56 many local

government officials report that discretionary dollars increasingly are
needed in corrections budgets. 5 7 Overall spending for corrections
was approximately 3.9% of all state and local governmental spending
in 1990.58 Total state and local spending for corrections during fiscal
year 1990 was just over $23.5 billion. 59 State and local corrections de60
partments employed the full time equivalent of 525,000 employees.
Accounting practices make it difficult to gather and compare
costs on prison construction and operation. Estimates on the cost to
build one prison cell range from $30,000 to $50,000 for new construction and approximately $15,000 per bed for additions to existing facilities. 61 The cost for confining an inmate in a state prison ranges from
62
$9,000 to $20,000 per year.
The attempt to predict the rate of crime or the rate of incarceration over the next decade is a risky business. The conventional wisdom in the 1970s was that as the baby boomers moved through the
prime crime age of fifteen years old to thirty-five years old, crime rates
would moderate. If the conventional wisdom had been accurate,
crime would have peaked in 1980. As noted above, this has not occurred. With the likelihood of increased concentration on drug prosecutions coupled with recent increases in juvenile crime and violent
crime, most projections point to a continuing need for more prison
space. 65 The public is equally as pessimistic as the experts in concluding that crime will continue to be a major public policy issue for the
foreseeable future. 64 One issue is clear: whatever attempts are made
to stem the rate of crime or to react to the rate of crime, the local
prosecutor will be at the center of the action.

56 UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,

supranote

3, at 16.
57 I&
58 BuRFAu OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 54, at 2.
59 Id. at

60

3.

Id. at 6.

61 UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supranote
3, at 127.
62 John N. Hauser &William D. Kissinger, An Answer to Overcrowding=Adopt the CJS Model
Adult Community Corrections Ac4 6 CGiM.Jusr. 13 (1992).
63 Id. at 20.

64 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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THE PREEMINENT ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR

THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

Care must be taken to understand the current state of the office
of the local prosecutor in light of the emphasis that history has placed
upon the crime control function of this independent office. The understanding begins with the historical origins of the office.
1.

History

The local prosecutor is an American innovation of European ancestry. Like the English Attorney General, the American prosecutor
has the power to terminate all criminal prosecutions. 6 5 Like the
French procureurpublique, the prosecutor has the power to initiate all
public prosecutions. 66 Similar to the Dutch schout, the prosecutor is a
local official of a regional government. 67 Whereas the American prosecutor's European precursors were agents of a national authority, pioneer life in America demanded that the primary law enforcement
68
official be an agent of the local government.
Early attempts to implement the English system of private prosecution in America fell victim to the twin factors of cost and demand.
65 JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 3 (1980). A

system of private prosecution prevailed in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. By filing a writ of nolle prosequi4 the English Attorney General could dismiss any
private prosecution. This purely discretionary power was occasionally used to control the
excesses of private prosecution. See Abraham Goldstein, History of the PublicPrasecutor,in 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME &JUST. 1286 (Sanford Kadish ed. 1988); but cf.John H. Langbein,
The Originsof PublicProsecution at Common Law, 17 AM. J. LECAL HisT. 313 (1973) (tracing
the origins of public prosecution in England to the Marian Statutes of 1554 and 1555
despite the prevailing system of private prosecution at the time). For a modern treatment
of the doctrine of nolle prosequi, see YALE KAMIsAR Er AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 91415 (8th ed. 1994).
Jacoby notes that scholars disagree on the historical origins of the American prosecutor, see NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON PROSECuTION 7 (1931) (favoring a strong French influence but overlooking the pre-American
Revolution origins of the prosecutor); see also W. Scott Van Alstyne, Jr., Comment, The
District Attorney---A HistoricalPuzzle, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 125 (1952) (arguing for a strong
Dutch influence) ;Jack M. Kress, Progressand Prosecution, 423 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL & Soc.
SCI. 99 (1976) (arguing that the true origin of the American prosecutor is a synthesis of the
three
major European influences).
66
JACOBY, supranote 65, at 3; cf. Roscoe Pound, The Influence of French Law in America, 3
ILL. L. REv. 354 (1908) (discussing the influence of civil law in its French form on American law during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries).
6 7
JACOBY, supra note 65, at 3. Professor Friedman notes that Dutch influence did not
end with the political domination of New York by the English in the middle of the seventeenth century. In New York's colonial judicial system, Dutch terminology and English
procedure coexisted until the early 1680s. See LAwRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 44-45 (1985).
68 JACOBY, supra note 65, at 5.
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Private prosecution for the pioneer society "entailed both effort and
expense to the private prosecutor, who was obliged to employ a lawyer
to conduct the preliminary stages of the prosecution and even the
trial itself."69 In addition, it was not until just prior to the American
Revolution that the rule denying counsel to felons was abolished. Until then, there was little occasion for the appearance of the "criminal
lawyer." During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries,
each colony established the office of the Attorney General, whose duties generally included the presentment of criminal indictments. By
the outbreak of the Revolution, private prosecution was replaced by
public prosecution through county officials, some of whom were deputies of the state Attorney General but were nominated by the county
court with little supervision of the Attorney General. Others were
deputies of the Attorney General, operating with direct supervision,
and others were county officials nominated by the local courts.7 0
By the early nineteenth century, the local prosecutor was merely
an adjunct of the local court.7 ' In the area of criminal prosecution,
the power and importance of the local sheriff and coroner clearly outstripped that of the local prosecutor.72 The wave of democratic zeal
that expanded suffrage in the American republic beginning about
1820 and culminating before the Civil War precipitated the movement to the election of local officials, including localjudges.7 3 After it
was commonplace to elect local judges, it became customary to elect
the prosecuting attorney.74
In 1832, Mississippi became the first state to include within its
constitution a provision for the popular election of local prosecuting
attorneys.7 5 The states entering the Union after 1850 generally provided for the election of the prosecuting attorney either through the
state constitution or through state statutes.7 6 This change from appointed to elected status allowed the local prosecutor to expand his
power. No longer beholden to the opinions and politics of those who
appointed him, the local prosecutor emerged as an executive official
69 HoMER S. CUMMINGS & CARL McFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE

13 (1937).

70 Id.
71 JACOBY, supra note 65, at 19.
72 I&
73 Id. at 25; see Goldstein, supranote 65, at 1287; see also LErvis MAYERS, THE AMERIGAN
LEGAL SymrF_ :THE ADMINISTRATION OFJUSTICE IN THE UNrrED STATES BYJUmcIAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, MILITARY,AND ARrrRAL TRIBUNALS 413 (2d ed. 1964); c JAMES W. HURST, THE
GROWrH OF AMERICAN LAWvTHE LAW MAKERS 251-357 (1950) (discussing the impact ofJack-

sonian Democracy on the profession of lawyering and the Bar).
74
JACoBY, supra note 65, at 24. Regarding the popular election ofjudges, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 126-27.
75 JACOBY, supra note 65, at 25.
76 Id. at 26.
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charged with using his individual discretion to apply local standards in
enforcing essentially local laws. 7 7 By 1912, when Arizona and New

Mexico were admitted to the Union as the last of the forty-eight contiguous states, all forty-eight states provided for local prosecutors
through either constitutional provision or statute; in all but five states
78
prosecutors were elected officials.
The post World War I increase in crime in America's urban centers led to serious examinations of the local prosecutor's role. 79 The

prosecutor's absolute discretion in the exercise of the local government's accusative powers and the lack of professionalism in the offices
of the prosecutor alarmed government commissions and legal scholars writing during the twenties and thirties.8 0 Crime commissions
were created in Baltimore and Chicago in 1921, Cleveland in 1922,
77 Id. at 25, 38. Professor Goldstein notes that the change in public andjudicial percep-

tions of the local prosecutor, i.e. from a minor judicial official to a member of the executive branch, was reflected in the new state constitutions of this time, which now listed the
prosecuting attorney as a member of the executive branch, along with other officials of
local government, Goldstein, supranote 65, at 1288.
78 JACOBY, supra note 65, at 26. As of 1912, Connecticut, Delaware, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Wyoming did not provide for the
office of prosecuting attorney by constitutional provision. The constitutions of the other
38 states provided for a prosecuting attorney. Earl H. De Long & Newman F. Baker, The
ProsecutingAttorney: Provisions of Law Organizing the Office, 23 J. CRM. L & CRIMINOLOGY
926, 928-29 (1933).
The five states as of 1912 that did not provide for the election of local prosecutors
were Connecticut, NewJersey, Delaware, Rhode Island, and Florida. SeeJacoby, supra note
65, at 26. Only Florida has since altered its procedure to provide for the election of prosecuting attorneys.
All four states in which the prosecuting attorneys are not elected were original states
of the Union. Jacoby suggests that this result is due to the preservation of their colonial
systems of prosecution. JACOBY, supra note 65, at 26.
79 JACOBY, supra note 65, at 30.
80 Id. at 30-34; see, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OaSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT,

supra note 65; De Long & Baker, supra note 78; Newman F. Baker, The Prosecutor:Initiation
of Prosecution,23J. CIuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 770 (1933); Newman F. Baker & Earl H. De

Long, The ProsecutingAttorney: Powers and Duties in Criminal Prosecution, 24 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1025 (1934); Earl H. De Long & Newman F. Baker, Powers and Duties of the
ProsecutingAttorney: Quasi-Criminaland Civi 25J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 21 (1934); Earl

H. De Long, Powers and Duties of the State Attorney-General in CriminalProsecution,25J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 358 (1934); Earl H. De Long & Newman F. Baker, The ProsecutingAttorney and His Office (pts. 1 & 2), 26J. CiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 695, 884 (1935); Newman F.
Baker & Earl H. De Long, The ProsecutingAttorney: TheProcess of Prosecution (pts. 1 & 2), 185
J. CRiM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 26 (1935); Newman F. Baker, The ProsecutingAttorney: Legal
Aspects of the Office, 26J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 647 (1936); Newman F. Baker & Earl H.
De Long, The ProsecutingAttorney and Reform in CriminalJustice,26J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 821 (1936); Newman F. Baker, Some Problems of CriminalProsecution,14 OR. L. REv. 153
(1934); Franklin G. Davidson, The ProsecutingAttorney's Office-Do Modern Conditions Create

New Dutiesfor This Office, 4 IND. L.J. 327 (1929); William B. Quinlan, The DistrictAttorney, 5
MARoQ. L. REv. 190 (1921); R.Justin Miller, Information orIndictments inFelony Cases, 8 MINN.
L. REv. 379 (1924); Raymond Moley, The Initiation of CriminalProsecutions by Indictment or
Information, 29 MICH. L. REV. 403 (1931).
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and the states of Missouri, Georgia, New York, Illinois, Minnesota,
Pennsylvania, and California before 1930.81 In 1931, the federal government created the Wickersham Commission to study the status of
2
criminal justice in the United States.
Generally the commissions found that the elective nature of the
office often led to undue political influence on prosecutorial decisions.8 3 The commissions also noted that the elective office did not
attract qualified candidates and that insufficient checks upon
prosecutorial discretion existed in the system. 8 4 The criticisms led to
few systemic changes. But by the early 1970s a significant majority of
the states required that the prosecutor be a licensed attorney. 85 States
86
also tended to make the office of the prosecutor a full-time position.
The history of the development of the office of prosecutor has
the clear theme, in the words ofJoan Jacoby, of "local representation
applying local standards to the enforcement of essentially local
laws."87
81 JACOBY, supra note 65, at 30. For a comprehensive bibliography of crime commission
reports and surveys through 1931, see NATIONAL CoMMISS10N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 65, at 257-64.
82 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 65, at 3.

83 E.g., id. at 14-15 (describing the notoriously intimate connection between criminal
justice and local politics during the early twentieth century).
84 JACOBY, supra note 65, at 31. See asoNATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 65, at 15-16 (noting that the office of prosecuting attorney was

generally filled by "ambitious beginners as a stepping-stone to practice," and that the insufficient checks on the prosecutorial discretion was "ideally adapted to misgovernment.").
85 JACOBY, supra note 65, at 34. See, e.g., People ex reL Elliott v. Benefiel, 91 N.E.2d 427,
429 (Ill. 1950) (holding that while there is no express statutory or constitutional specification that a State's Attorney be a lawyer, both the term State's Attorney and the duties as
prescribed by statute imply that the State's Attorney be licensed to practice law); see also
State ex reL Indiana State Bar Association v. Moritz, 191 N.E.2d 21, 24-25 (Ind.1963) (holding that although respondent was elected prosecuting attorney, inasmuch as he had not
met the requirements for admission to the state bar, he was not entitled to practice law as a
prosecuting attorney); but cf State ex reL. Dostert v. Riggleman, 187 S.E.2d 591, 596 (W. Va.
1972) (holding that a candidate for the office of prosecuting attorney who, at the time of
the primary election, was not a duly licensed attorney, but could remove his ineligibility
before the next general election or the commencement of the next term of office, could
be nominated for such office).
New York is a prominent example of a state without a license requirement for its
district attorneys. See People v. Carter, 566 N.E.2d 119, 123-24 (N.Y. 1990), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 976 (1991) (holding that neither the constitution nor any statute requires that a district attorney or an assistant district attorney be an attorney admitted to practice law).
86
JACOBY, supra note 65, at 35.
87 Id. at 38. Compare Jacoby's conclusion with Langbein, supra note 65, at 335 (summarizing the theme of the Marian Statutes, which authorized public prosecution by Justices of the Peace, as "[p]rosecution should be local, to draw upon the knowledge of the
community."). See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN., § 5.751 (Callaghan 1973).
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2. Description of the Office
The authority of local prosecutors is detailed in the state constitutions of thirty-three states.8 8 Often the state constitutional provisions
are fleshed out by statutes.8 9 In twelve states authority for local prosecutors is only statutorily based. 9 0 In four states, local prosecutors are
part of the statewide state attorney general's office and are controlled
by the state attorney general.9 1 In some states prosecutorial decisionmaking takes on a distinctive flavor. In Arizona, for example, the attorney general has limited jurisdiction over specific crimes if the
charges were brought through the state grandjury. 92 If there is a conflict of interest or if the local prosecutor seeks assistance, the Arizona
attorney general may prosecute local crimes. 93 In Maine, the salaries
of assistant district attorneys are subject to the approval of the governor and the attorney general.9 4 In New Hampshire, the county attorneys act under the direction of the attorney general.9 5
The majority of local prosecutors prosecute cases within the jurisdiction of the county,9 6 and a few local prosecutors prosecute crimes
only within the jurisdiction of a city. 9 7 A sizeable minority of local
88 See AlA. CONST. of 1901, amend. 328, § 6.21(f); ARiz. CONST. art. XII, § 3; Aax.
CONST. of 1874, art 7, § 24; ARK. CONST. of 1874, amend. 21; COLO. CONST. art 6, § 13; FLA.
CONST. art V, § 17; GA. CONST. art. VI, § VIII, I I; IDAHO CONST. art V, § 18; ILL. CoNST.
art. 6, § 19; IND. CONST. art. 7, § 16; Ky. CONsr. §§ 97, 99; LA. CONST. art. V, § 26; MD.
CONST. art. V, § 7; MicH. CONST. of 1963 art VII, § 4; Miss. CONST. art. VI, § 174; MONT.
CONST. of 1972 art XI, § III; NEv. CONsT. art 4, § 32; N.H. CONST. part 2, art. 71; NJ.
CONsr. art 7, § 2, 1 1; N.M. CONST. art VI, § 24; N.Y. CONsT. art XIII, § 13; N.C. art. IV,
§ 18; N.D. CONsT. art VII, § 8; OR. CONSr. art. VII, § 17; PA. CONST. art. 9, § 4, 1I. CONST.
art IX, § 12; TENN. CoNsT. art VI, § 5; TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 65; UTAH CONST. art VIII,
§ 16; VT. CONSr. ch. II, § 50; VA. CONsT. art VII, § 4; WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 5; W. VA.
CONST. art IX, § 1; WIs. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
89 See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN., § 5.751 (Callaghan 1973).
90 See AL,. CONST. of 1901, amend. 328, § 6.21(f); Amiz. CONST. art. XII, § 3; ARx.
CONST. of 1874, art. 7, § 24; ARx. CONST. of 1874, amend. 21; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 24000
(Deering 1973); GA. CONST. art. VI, § VIII, I I; HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 62-1, 62-71 (1968);
IDAHO CONST. art V, § 18; I1. CONsT. art 6, § 19; IND. CONST. art 7, § 16; IOWA CODE
§ 331.751 (1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-101 (1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 30-a, § 251
(West 1973); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 12, § 12 (1985); MINN. STAT. § 388.01 (1976); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 56.010 (1986 Supp.); NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-1201 (1943); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 309.01 (Baldwin 1976); OKLA. STAT. tit 19, § 215.1 (1971); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 716-1 (1967); Wyo. STAT. § 18-109 (1957).
91 See ALASKA STAT. § 44.23.020(a) (3) (1993); CONN. CON5T. of 1985 art. 23; CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 51-275-288 (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 29, § 2502 (1972); RI. CONST. art. IX, § 12;
R.I. GEN. LAws ch. 9, tit. 42 (1987).
92 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21424 (1992).
93 ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-193 (1992).
94 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. § 272(3) (West 1994).
95 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7:34 (1988).
96 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 331.751 (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 388.01 (West
Supp. 1995).
97 See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art 10, § 34 (1957).
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prosecutors have jurisdiction over matters arising in more than one
county.98 In Texas, more than one district attorney may have jurisdiction over a criminal matter. 99
All local prosecutors have jurisdiction over criminal matters. In
some jurisdictions criminal appeals are argued by the local prosecutor 0 0 whereas in other states the state attorney general handles criminal appeals.' 0 ' In Oregon, appeals can be handled by either office.' 0 2
In most jurisdictions, local prosecutors prosecute juvenile matters.' 0 3
In many jurisdictions, the local prosecutor also serves as counsel for
04
the local jurisdiction in civil matters.
The great majority of local prosecutors, whether the office is a
constitutionally based office or simply a statutorily created office, are
elected officials. 10 5 In NewJersey, however, the local prosecutor is appointed by the governor with the advice and counsel of the state senate.10 6 In larger jurisdictions the local prosecutor is a full-time
position and the prosecutor and assistants are prohibited from conducting a private practice. 0 7 In smallerjurisdictions, it is not uncommon for either the prosecutor, the assistants, or both, to be part-time
officials.108 For example, in Virginia, seventy-six local prosecutors are
full time officials while forty-five local prosecutors hold part-time
positions. 10 9
There is relatively little written about the day-to-day workings of
the prosecutor's office. Perhaps the most reliable information comes
from the biennial report of the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the
United States Department of Justice." 0 Even this report, which is
based upon the results of a survey of 290 prosecutors nationwide, is
only the second report produced by the Bureau."' Some of the information provided by the Bureau is titillating for what it does not re98 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.

more than one county, see Am
§ 215.1 (West 1988).

§ 16-21-101 (Michie 1994) (a judicial district consists of
§ 16-13-901 (1994)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,

CODE ANN.

99 See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 48.101 et. seq. (West 1988).
100 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1402 (Supp. 1995).
101 See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 34 (1994); NEB. REv. STAT. § 23-1201 (1991).
102 OR. REv. STAT. § 180.060(d)(4) (1995).
103 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. 20-7-630 (Supp. 1995).
104 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-17-184(3) (1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 388.051 (West Supp.

1995).

105 UNrrED STATES DEi. OF JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 2.
106 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.158-1 (West 1985).
107 UNITED STATES DEPT. OFJUSrICE, supra note 8, at 1.
108 Id.
109 NATIONAL DismICr ArroRNEYs ASSOCIATION, 1994 NATIONAL DIRECrORY OF PROSE-

CUTING ATToRNmS 168.

110 BuREAu OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 7.
111 Id. at 2.
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port: for example, in the seventy-five largest counties in the United
States, 48% of the offices had at least one prosecutor who was
armed."12 Other information is very important as background information for this proposal for change.
As defined in the Bureau ofJustice Statistics survey, a "chief prosecutor" is the most popular title for the attorney who advocates for the
public in felony cases."13 More than 95% of the chief prosecutors are
elected locally."14 About three-fourths of the prosecutors' offices represented jurisdictions with less than 65,000 people. Only one percent
of the offices represent jurisdictions in which the population exceeds
one million."15 A workforce of approximately 57,000 full-time and
part-time professional and support staff were employed by local prosecutors."16 The largest office is the Office of the District Attorney of
1 7
Los Angeles County which employs more than 2,700 people.
Across the nation, about one-third of the offices had a total staff of
four or fewer, including the chief prosecutor. The median total staff
size was seven, with a median of three assistant prosecutors."l 8
Prosecutors are usually white males-70% of prosecutors are
male and 88% of prosecutors are white, non-Hispanic. 119 About onethird of all prosecutors have had nine or more years of trial experience; one-third has had less than four years trial experience. 20 In
12
70% of the offices, the chief prosecutor served full time. '
More than half of the nation's prosecuting offices closed more
than 800 cases per year. 122 The median number of felony cases closed
by each office was 203.123 The average closed case cost the office approximately $400 to process to completion.' 24 A majority of offices
125 Almost
handled newly created crimes within the last three years.
126
universally prosecutors notified victims of the outcome of the case.
Local funding (money from county or city sources) accounts for
112 Id.
11S Id.

114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 1.
117 Id. at 2.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 3.
120 Id.
121

Id. at 2.

122 Id. at
123 Id.
124

Id.

at

3.
1.

125 Id.
126

Id. at 7.
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more than 90% of prosecution costs nationally. 27 Only 11% of prosecuting offices were funded solely by state funds, while 39% of prosecutors were funded solely by county or city funds.' 28 Those offices which
had funds from both state and local sources received the great majority of their funds from local sources. 12 9 For example, the Los Angeles
County District Attorney receives 90% of its $218 million budget from
local sources. 13 0 The entire $15 million budget of the Dallas prosecutor's office comes from local funding. 1 1 Budgets for prosecutors
ranged from $21,000 to over $200 million. On average prosecutors
13 2
operated on a budget of $196,000 per year.
The internal management of local prosecutor offices varies
greatly among jurisdictions, dependent mainly on the size of the office. Only one prosecutor of the 290 prosecutors who were surveyed
by the Bureau reported no plea negotiations in felony cases for 1992.
More than 90% of the offices reported that plea negotiations included
charging and sentencing recommendations.'33 Factors considered in
plea bargaining included a defendant's criminal history, defendant's
cooperation with the prosecution, strength of the case, evidentiary
127

Id. at 3.

128 Id.
129 Id.

1SO

Id.

131 The United States Department ofJustice Bureau of Statistics has been most generous

in providing budget details for 47 of the largest 75 counties in the United States. Excerpts
for 19 counties are reported below:
County

Total Budget

% State Funds

% County/City Funds

Maricopa, AZ
$ 29,162,692
17%
82%
Los Angeles, CA
217,494,000
10
90
Orange, CA
31,577,163
5
90
Sacramento, CA
31,814,448
8
92
San Diego, CA
48,523,170
32
68
San Francisco, CA
15,085,522
0
100
Santa Clara, CA
22,779,088
6
94
Broward, FL
15,254,749
92
8
Dade, FL
27,005,427
88
11
Cook, IL
57,600,000
0
100
Wayne, I
17,853,470
4
95
Essex, NJ
-19,224,282
0
95
Kings, NY
45,976,073
12
83
Nassau, NY
17,500,000
6
93
New York, NY
55,486,410
6
87
Suffolk, NY
16,407,192
13
87
Philadelphia, PA
33,500,000
9
84
Harris, TX
20,810,201
0
100
King, WA
17,700,000
15
85
Letter from Carol DeFrances, Statistician, Bureau ofJustice Statistics, United States Dept.
ofJustice, to Robert Misner (Jan. 27, 1995) (on file with the author).
132 BuR.Au OFJUsTicE STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 3.
133 Id. at 5.
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problems, and victims' concerns. Only about 12% of prosecutors' offices in 1992 had written criteria governing negotiations.13 4 Case-bycase supervisory review, office wide unwritten policy, mandatory sentencing laws, and sentencing practices were listed in order of frequency as the means that local prosecutors used to control plea
bargaining within their office§. In more than 25% of all offices, caseby-case supervisory review was the only means of controlling plea bargaining.1 3 5 More than 60% of prosecutors reported having a policy
which required plea bargaining to be completed before either the setting of a trial date or before the start of the trial.136

More than 93% of all offices reported felony cases that resulted
in the imposition of sanctions other than incarceration or probation.
These sanctions included counseling and drug therapy, victim compensation, forfeiture of property, and residence in halfway houses. An
increasing number of offices reported the use of "loss of liberty" sanctions which include electronic surveillance, house arrest, or boot
37
camp.1
B.

CENTERING POWER IN THE PROSECUTOR

Before tracking the dominance of prosecutorial discretion in the
criminal justice system, a few words must be written on the general
notion of discretion in crime enforcement. Whether a particular decision in crime enforcement is a legislative, judicial, police or prison
decision, the great likelihood is that the decision will never be reviewed through any judicial or administrative process.
1.

Unreviewed Discretion as the Norm

Legislators, police, prosecutors, and prison officials have enormous discretion as to most tasks for which they are responsible. Contrary to popular belief, attempts to impose any sort of judicial or
administrative review on the great majority of the decisions of these
offices have been grandly unsuccessful. To date review of these decisions through the political process has only come haphazardly. In
those few areas in which the court has intervened, the recent trend is
for the court to retreat to a "hands off" policy.
In the past three decades legislative bodies have seen relatively
few instances in which the courts have moved to strike down criminal
law legislation. In states where legislatures have created volumes of
134 Id.
135 Id.
136

Id.

137 Id.

at 6.
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new criminal statutes and redrafted entire criminal codes, the new legislation has withstood constitutional challenges despite the fact that
many of the revised codes contain numerous overlapping provisions
which criminalize the same conduct with widely varying penalties. 3 8
Even in such substantive areas as hate crimes, 139 which seem to be
inherently suspect on First Amendment grounds, statutes have often
been upheld. Courts have almost universally agreed that the legislature is free to shift power from the court as in the area of mandatory
sentencing and sentencing guidelines.' 40 Legal theories which at one
time appeared to present courts with the opportunity to play a more
14 1 status, 1 42
dominant role in setting criminal law policy-vagueness,

and sentencing proportionality' 4 3 -have generally run their course.
Only in the death penalty have courts exhibited a desire for continued
active supervision over legislative decision-making. 4 4
Similar conclusions are warranted regarding police discretion.
The day-to-day, minute-to-minute decisions by the police have never
been reviewed by the court. Police decisions regarding which crimes
to investigate, which persons to pursue, and which persons to arrest
138 See infra notes 216-27 and accompanying text.
139 See generaly Frederick M. Lawrence, The Punishment of Hate: Toward a Normative Theoy

of Bias-Motivated Crimes, 93 MIcH. L. REv. 320 (1994) (analyzing Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508
U.S. 476 (1993), and its application to state bias crimes).
140 See, e.g., State v. Spinney, 820 P.2d 854, 856-57 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) "It is within the
legislature's power to establish criminal penalties, whether mandatory minimum sentences
or a range of possible sentences." I&
141 SeeJohn C. Jeffiies, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Constructionof Penal Statutes, 71 VA.
L. Rnv. 189 (1985). See generally WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AusmI W. Scorr, Jp., CRIMINAL LAv
§ 2.3 (2d ed. 1986).
142 See LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 141 § 2.14(f). But see State v. Richard, 836 P.2d 622
(Nev. 1992) (striking down Nevada and Las Vegas loitering laws).
143 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (upholding mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole for possession of 672 grams of cocaine). The Harmelin
statute was held to be unconstitutional by the Michigan Supreme Court on the grounds
that the statute violated the Michigan Constitution's prohibition of cruel or unusual punishment. People v. Bullock, 485 N.W. 2d 866 (Mich. 1992). See also State v. Bartlett, 830
P.2d 823 (Ariz. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 511 (1992).
144 Beginning in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the United States Supreme
Court has ruled on a staggering number of capital punishment cases. For every United
States Supreme Court case on capital punishment, whether the case raises issues of racial
discrimination, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), execution of minors, e.g.,
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), or accomplice liability, e.g., Tison v. Arizona,
481 U.S. 137 (1987), there exists a corresponding body of state case law implementing and
interpreting the United States Supreme Court opinions. See, e.g., People v. Melton, 750
P.2d 741, 777 (Cal.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 934 (1988) and Spencer v. State, 398 S.E.2d 179,
185 (Ga. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 960 (1991) (discussing McCleskey); exparte Davis, 554
So.2d 1111, 1113-14 (Ala. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1127 (1991) and State v.Jimenez, 799
P.2d 785, 797 (Ariz. 1990) (discussing Stanford); Jackson v. State, 575 So. 2d 181, 190-93
(Fla. 1993) (discussing Enmund v. Florida and Tison); Rouster v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1342,
1350 (Ind. 1992) (discussing Tison).
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have come under judicial review only in the most egregious situadons.' 45 Opinions by the Warren Court permitted judicial review of
some police behavior; police were strongly encouraged to use search
warrants,1 46 required to inform arrestees of their rights,147 and mandated to cease interrogation when requested by an arrestee.' 46 If police did not follow evidence gathering protocol established by the
courts, the evidence would be excluded in a subsequent trial.'

49

It is

doubtful that the exclusionary rule was ever more than a symbolic
remedy,150 but even the symbolism of the exclusionary rule has been
quickly and consistently limited by the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts.15 1 Developments in such procedural areas as standing, 5 2 stop
and frisk,' 55 administrative searches, 5 4 automobile searches, 15 5 impeachment, 15 6 and post conviction relief1 5 7 have all resulted in a con-

tinued narrowing of judicial review of police conduct. Even in areas
in which judicial review is permitted, plea bargaining may moot judicial oversight of police conduct.

Nowhere in the criminal justice system of the 1960s was the use of
discretion less visible and more abused than the discretion exercised

by prison officials.' 5 8 During the decade of the 1970s prisoners
145 See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (fingerprinting 25 African-American
youths in order to match prints with those found at scene of rape violated Fourth
Amendment.).
146 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ("Searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.").
147 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
148 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), rehg denied, 452 U.S. 973 (1981).
149 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
150 Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionay Rule:An EmpiricalAssessmen4 1983
AM. B. FOUND. Rs. J. 585, 598 (physical evidence suppressed in .69% of 7,484 cases sampled). See generally Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE LJ. 906 (1986).
'5'
See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984) (development of good-faith
exception to exclusionary rule). See also WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARcH AND SmzuRE § 1.3 (2d
ed. 1987).
152 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
'53 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
'54 Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
155 Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975), reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 1081 (1976).
156 United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
'57 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976) (state prisoner cannot be granted federal
habeas corpus relief if prisoner has had full and fair opportunity in state courts to raise
Fourth Amendment issues).
158 The brutality of prison life can be seen at its worst in the Arkansas prison system. In
Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971), affid
sub nom. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979), Judge
Henley documents a system in which inmate trusties used bribery, extortion and violence
to effectively operate the Cummins facility. It does not appear that the Arkansas prison
system stood alone in its lawlessness. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976),
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sought to impose judicial review over virtually all actions taken by
prison officials and, perhaps for a fleeting moment, it appeared that
the prisoners might win. Lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of
prison conditions usually began with a valid claim of prison overcrowding, 59 which then led to claims involving mail, 160 access to
courts,' 6' access to lawyers, 162 food, religion

65

and a host of other

issues. 164

It became rather commonplace for federal courts to seize
some portion of operational control of state prisons andjails.165 Limitations were generally placed upon prison populations 66 and someaffd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part and remanded
sub nora. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956
(D.R.I. 1977). See also MicHAEL B. MUSHLN, RIGHTS OF PiusONERS § 2.14 (2d ed. 1993);
Michael S. Feldberg, Comment, Confronting the Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded Role
for Courts in PrisonReform, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L REv. 367 (1977). For a defense of federal
court intervention, see Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352-61 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
159 See MUSHLiN, supra note 158, § 2.12. The theory is that overcrowding causes stress
and increased violence and puts unbearable strains on prison programs. See Fisher v.
Koehler, 692 F. Supp. 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). In Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348-50, the court held
that overcrowding per se did not violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Serious hardships must be shown to have resulted from the overcrowding. Id. at 351-52.
160 In Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), the Court limited prison regulations
as they impacted prisoner mail. The Court viewed the issue from the perspective of the
free world correspondent to the "legitimate and substantial" state interests in operating a
prison system. Id. at 412. In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), the Court upheld a
Missouri ban on correspondence between inmates. In Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401
(1989), the Court upheld the broad discretion of a warden to reject publications from
entering the prison.
161 InJohnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969),Justice Fortas wrote for the Court that "it is
fundamental that. access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting their
complaints may not be denied or obstructed." Id. at 485. In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817
(1977), the Court required that North Carolina inmates have access to a law library or an
alternative means to assist them in accessing the courts. See MUSHUN, supra note 158,
§ 11.02.
162 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (allowing prison officials to open mall
from inmate's attorney in presence of inmate).
163 In Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), the Court held that an inmate retained substantial First Amendment rights to practice his religion. In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482
U.S. 342 (1987), the Court used a rational relationship test to justify restricting Muslim
inmates at a New Jersey prison. See MUSHLIN, supra note 158, § 6.00 et seq.
164 See, e.g.,J. PALMER, CONSTrrUTONAL RIGHTS OF PlUSONEaS 173 (3d ed. 1985) in which
the author documents prison litigation in eight main areas: use of force, visitation and
association rights, mail, isolated confinement, religiou's rights, legal services, disciplinary
procedures and parole.
165 In Inmates of Suffolk CountyJail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass 1973) affd,
494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1974), the court issued an injunction covering almost every aspect
of prison life including the wattage of light bulbs. See also Rhem v. Malcolm, 377 F. Supp.
995 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified, 507 F.2d. 333 (2d Cir. 1974) (federal district court issued
orders to close jail facilities);Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
166 See Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. dened, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983)
(requiring 60 square feet per inmate in dormitories); see also Burks v. Teasdale, 603 F.2d 59
(8th Cir. 1979). But see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
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times a master was appointed to oversee prison operations.' 67 New
disciplinary procedures 168 and greater access of prisoners to the
outside world were required by judicial decree. 169 Early on in prisoner rights litigation, some courts seem posed to find a constitutional
right of the prisoner to rehabilitation 7 0° and even flirted with a concept of "least restrictive punishment."' 71 Both of these developments
would have created a very different prison system through litigation
than had been created through legislation and executive decree. In
no other part of the criminal justice system was greater use made of
judicial review over day-to-day matters. Even in noncriminal areas
such as school desegregation, federal courts were usually satisfied with
a court order that delivered children to the front door of the school
and did not attempt to review what went on in the classroom. 172
In defense of federal court intervention into state prison management, states appeared to be unwilling to acknowledge that increasing
crime and increasing prosecutions required a larger commitment of
resources simply to house prisoners in a safe and sanitary way. Once
prison litigation had forced states to build more prisons and once issues such as mail, visiting lawyer access, and medical treatment were
resolved, federal courts agreed that most decisions on the daily care
and treatment of prisoners were discretionary decisions of state officials. The United States Supreme Court, in cases such as Bell v. Wolfish,173 reinforced the long held tradition that courts should not be too
167 See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 331-32 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
168 See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (requiring certain due process
protections before good time could be lost); but see Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976) (no liberty interest which would require due process protection is implicated when a prisoner is transferred from one prison to another prison). See,
MUSHUN, supra note 158, § 9.00 et seq.
169 See supra note 158.

170 See Pugh, 406 F. Supp. at 330; see also Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.
1970), aft'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). But see Padgett v. Stein, 406 F. Supp. 287, 296
(M.D. Pa. 1975) ("[W]hether penal institutions should undertake to rehabilitate prisoners
... is a social policy question [for] ... the legislative and executive branches.").
171 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 532-40 (1978).
172 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 16-15 (2d ed. 1988).
173 441 U.S. at 562:

There was a time not too long ago when the federal judiciary took a completely
"hands-off" approach to the problem of prison administration. In recent years, how-

ever, these courts largely have discarded this "hands-off" attitude and have waded into
this complex arena. The deplorable conditions and Draconian restrictions of some of
our nation's prisons are too well known to require recounting here, and the federal
courts rightly have condemned these sordid aspects of our prison systems. But many
of these same courts have, in the name of the Constitution, become increasingly enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations. Judges, after all, are human. They, no
less than others in our society, have a natural tendency to believe that their individual
solutions to often intractable problems are better and more workable than those of
the persons who are actually charged with and trained in the running of the particular
institution under examination. But under the Constitution, the first question to be
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anxious to become involved in the day-to-day decisions of prison officials.' 74 Although many prisons and jails remain under some degree
of federal court control, the trend has been clearly to return to a
"hands off' policy by the courts.
2.

Trends Which Have Enhanced ProsecutorialPower

Although the discretion given to the legislature, to the police,
and to prison officials is broad and immensely important, the prosecutor has become the most powerful office in the criminal justice system.
The prosecutor's authority is evident in bail hearings, 75 grants of immunity, 176 and in trial strategy. 177 But in the areas of charging, bargaining, and sentencing, it has become clear that the prosecutor plays
178
the pivotal role in the criminal justice process. Despite criticism,
plea bargaining continues unabated. 179 While few courts have rather
answered is not whose plan is best, but in what branch of the Government is lodged
the authority to initially devise the plan. This does not mean that constitutional rights
are not to be scrupulously observed. It does mean, however, that the inquiry of federal courts into prison management must be limited to the issue of whether a particular system violates any prohibition of the Constitution or, in the case of a federal
prison, a statute. The wide range of "judgment calls" that meet constitutional and
statutory requirements are confided to officials outside of the Judicial Branch of
Government.
174 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981):
In discharging this oversight responsibility, however, courts cannot assume that
state legislatures and prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of
the penal function in the criminal justice system: to punish justly, to deter future
crime, and to return imprisoned persons to society with an improved chance of being
useful, law-abiding citizens.
But there seems to be no doubt that the "hands off" doctrine will never return.
MUSHLIN, supranote 158, at § 1.03.
175 Ajudge's decision as to bail is impacted by the charge which the prosecutor chooses
as well as the prosecutor's argument as to the strength of the case and the arrestee's background. See, WAYNE R. LAFAvE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 12.1 (2d ed.
1992); PAUL B. WicE, BAIL AND ITS RFoRM: A NATIONAL SURVEY 15-17 (1973), cited in STEPHEN A. SALZBURG & DANIEL. J. CAPRA, AMEPICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 711-12 (4th ed.
1992).
176 See LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 175, at § 8.11.
177 See, e.g., Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) in whichJustice Scalia, writing for
the Court, discussed the broad discretion given to prosecutors to decide when to try defendants jointly. "Jointtrials play a vital role in the criminal justice system, accounting for
almost one-third of federal criminal trials in the past five years .... Joint trials generally
serve the interests ofjustice by avoiding inconsistent verdicts and enabling more accurate
assessment of relative culpability-advantages which sometimes operate to the defendant's
benefit." Id. at 209-10. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 175, at §§ 17.1-17.3.
178 See infra part HI.B.2.b.
179 See infra notes 236-38 and accompanying text. The United States Sentencing Commission reviewed 40,000 federal convictions and found that 85% of federal criminal convictions came as a result of plea bargaining. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INIIA. SENTENCING GUIEuLINEs AND PoucY STATEMENTS 48
(1987).
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unsuccessfully attempted to formulate "a common law of
prosecutorial discretion," 180 the authority of the prosecutor continues
to grow.
Three closely related trends have been at work to promote the
authority of the prosecutor. First, current criminal codes contain so
many overlapping provisions that the choice of how to characterize
conduct as criminal has passed to the prosecutor. In many cases the
legislature has effectively delegated its prerogative to define the nature and severity of criminal conduct to the prosecutor. Legislative
mandates regarding sentencing maxima, sentencing minima, and sentencing guidelines are dependent upon the substantive charge chosen
by the prosecutor. In addition, prosecutors have the untrammeled
authority to select the number of separate criminal acts for which the
defendant will be charged. The prosecutors also determine whether
to seek sentencing enhancements.' 8 1
Second, the increase in reported crime without a concomitant
increase in resources dedicated to the prosecution and defense of
criminal conduct has resulted in a criminal process highly dependent
upon plea bargaining. There are very few restraints placed upon the
prosecutor in the bargaining process.' 8 2 Third, the development of
sentencing guidelines and a growth of statutes with mandatory minimum sentences have increased the importance of the charging decision since the charging decision determines the range of sentences
available to the court.' 8 3 These three interrelated trends are also buttressed by the fact that in a majority of the states the office of the local
prosecutor is a state constitutional office which in itself guarantees a
modicum of independence.18 4
The trends which have reinforced the important historical role of
the prosecutor have not created a transitory situation. Whether one
agrees with the critics of the role of the prosecutor, it appears that the
future belongs to the prosecutor. Proposals to guarantee greaterjustice for defendants or more efficient use of scarce resources must accept the fact that the prosecutor has become, and will remain, the
preeminent office in the criminal justice system.
180 See ABRAiAm S. GoLusriN, THE PASSWEJUDICLARY

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND

THE GUILTy PLFA 52-75 (1981) (arguing that it is preferable to follow a course of common

law development of rules for use of prosecutorial discretion rather than attempting to
establish guidelines through rule-making process.).
181 See Knapp, supranote 12, at 682.
182 See infra part III.B.2.b.
183 See infra part III.B.2.c.
184 See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
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Charging Decisions

One might assume that criminal law policy is made by the legislature and implemented by the police, the prosecutor, the court, and
the prison. The fact that common law crimes have been abated, and
therefore courts can no longer create new crimes to meet new challenges, 8 5 would also seem to solidify the centrality of policy-making in
the legislature. In practice, the legislature has abdicated much of its
authority to the prosecutor. In the area of charging, prosecutorial decisions-such as whether to prosecute, how to prosecute, how long to
sentence, and whether to dismiss charges-all contribute to the creation of the prosecutor as the real policy-maker within the criminal
justice system. At best the legislature is a lesser partner whose role is
to set the outer parameters of criminal law policy and to find prisons.
The prosecutor's decision not to prosecute a case is virtually unreviewable. Although for some this authority "border[s] on anarchy,"18 6 the case law in both federal and state jurisdictions have
ignored the criticism and have only rarely constrained the decision in
any meaningful way.' 8 7 Likewise, decisions regarding diversion programs, 8 8 venue, 189 immunity, 190 and victim participation' 9 1 are left to
185 See LAFAvE & Scoa-r, supranote 141, § 2.1 at 74 ("And thus it is not surprising that as
more and more states have enacted comprehensive new criminal codes in place of the
miscellaneous collection of uncoordinated statutes, they have generally abolished common
law crimes."). The Commentary to the Model Penal Code reported that since the "promulgation of the Model Penal Code, statutes specifically abolishing common law offenses have
been enacted in twenty-five jurisdictions and have been proposed in ten." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 1.05 cmt. at 75 (1984).
186 Thurman W. Arnold, Law Enforcement-An Attempt at SocialDissection,42 YALE LJ. 1, 7
(1932) (discussion of the prosecutor's role in the Ideal of Law Enforcement).
187 See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379-83
(2d Cir. 1973) (The discretion of the prosecutor not to prosecute either federal or state
officials following the Attica prison riot is not subject to review.). Some federal courts have

distinguished the prosecutor's decision not to prosecute from the prosecutor's decision to
dismiss a charge after the case has been commenced. See United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d
504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975) (The prosecutor's decision to terminate a prosecution should be
respected unless the decision is "clearly contrary to manifest public interest."), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 971 (1976). State court review of the prosecutor's decision to dismiss a charge
may depend upon the state constitution or state statute. See infra note 233.
188 See LAFAVE & IsAm., supra note 175, § 13.6.
189 Many times the prosecutor will have no choice regarding where to prosecute a crime.
In federal cases, the prosecutor has a choice of venue if the offense was "begun in one
district and completed in another." 18 U.S.CA. § 3237(a) (1994). See United States y.
Reed, 773 F.2d 477 (2d. Cir. 1985) (applying a "contacts approach" to determining venue).
State venue questions are not easily classified. Some state constitutions determine venue
while in other states, issues are governed by state statute. See LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note
175, § 16.1(c) at 340.
190 See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 175, § 8.11.
191 SeeAbraham S. Goldstein, The Victim and ProsecutorialDiscretion: The FederalVictim and
Witness Protection Act of 1982, 47 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 225 (1984). See also Sarah N.
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the unreviewable discretion of the prosecutor. Even claims of selective enforcement are rarely successful. 19 2 Attempts to convince prosecutors to publish the guidelines for making prosecutorial charging
decisions, even in such prestigious studies as the ABA Standardsfor
CriminalJustice Prosecution Function and Defense Function'9 3 and the
194
American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure,
have generally gone unheeded. When guidelines have been drafted,
they have generally been so broad as to be of little predictive value. 195
After a decision about whether to prosecute is made, the major
decisions by the prosecutor center on the choice and number of
charges on which to proceed. It is with these decisions that the prosecutor begins to set crime enforcement policy. Over time,
prosecutorial discretion has been enhanced because criminal codes
have become "society's trash bin [s]."196 This is a result of a legislative
tendency to "make a crime of everything that people are against, withWelling, Victims in the Criminal Process: A UtilitarianAnalysis of Victim Participation in the
ChargingDecision, 30 ARIz. L. REv. 85 (1988).
192 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985). See also United States v. Armstrong,
48 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1995).
195 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNC-

TION § 3-3.4 (3d ed. 1993).
194 MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 10.3 (1975). Professors LaFave and

Israel cite the reasons for controlling prosecutorial discretion through rulemaking:
(1) rules aid in the training of new assistant prosecutors and in the internal review of
all prosecution decisions, so that office policy is consistently and efficiently carried
out; (2) rules give greater substance to administrative orjudicial appeal rights, since in
the absence of such rules it is difficult for victims or defendants to discover and prove
that they have been treated differently; (3) in some cases, it may also be appropriate
for defendants or complainants to challenge prosecution policy itself (as opposed to
failures to follow the policy) as being inconsistent with legislative intent or constitutional requirements; (4) rules permit the legislature to know exactly how much of the
substantive criminal law is being actively enforced, against which types of offenders,
and for what purposes, and this information permits more intelligent and realistic
legislative action; (5) rules serve to reassure the public, complainants and defendants
that the prosecutor is not above the law; and (6) in the rare cases in which nonprosecution represents de facto decriminalization (such as fornication and homosexuaity offenses), potential offenders are entitled to know that their conduct will not be
criminally punished, so they need not fear blackmail or harassment.
LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 175, § 13.2(f) at 171 (quotingRichardS. Frase, The Decision to
FileFederal Criminal Charges:A Quantitative Study of ProsecutorialDiscretion,47 U. CHI. L REV.
246, 296-97 (1980)).
195 U.S. DEP'T. OFJUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION (1980). The Justice De-

partment Standards have been criticized as "general, malleable, and unhelpful." Vorenberg, supra note 4, at 1544. See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 388.051(3) (West Supp. 1995)
(requiring county attorneys to adopt written guidelines regarding charging and plea negotiation policies as ofJanuary 1, 1995); WASH. REv. STAT. ANN.§9.94A.440 (1992) (detailing
considerations for decisions not to prosecute, decisions to prosecute, selection of charges
and police investigation).
196 Statement by a representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, quoted in the
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:

THE COURTS 107 (1967) (quoted in LaFave, supra note 4, at 533).
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out regard to enforceability, [or] changing social concepts." 97 But it
is the breadth of crime definition that is a major source of
prosecutorial power. By choosing to create a large number of crimes,
and by defining those crimes with the breadth proposed by the Model
Penal Code, legislatures make it impossible to enforce all criminal
statutes and, at the same time, make it possible for a single act to be
charged under many overlapping provisions.
In May 1962, the American Law Institute approved the final draft
of the Model Penal Code.1 98 The intent of the drafters was to produce a model code which would serve as a comprehensive guide for
drafting statutes in a broad array of criminal law subjects. The intent
was to create a code and commentary which would permit state legislatures to re-think and then re-cast its criminal law. The intent was
not to create a uniform criminal code, unlike the intent of the drafters of the Uniform Criminal Code, but to create a model from which
state legislatures might draw.' 99
In the past three decades, thirty-six states have adopted new criminal law codes.200 Although none of the new codes adopt the Model
Penal Code without some local variations, most have been heavily influenced by the Model Penal Code. Most redrafted codes faithfully
follow many of the Model Penal Code provisions.2 0 ' Certainly the
Model Penal code is rightfully seen as the most important develop202
ment in American criminal law in this century.
The revised state codes are more comprehensive and more uniform than the codes they replaced. 20 3 But what the Model Penal
Code did not do-and was never intended to do-was to restrict the
criminalization of a particular act to one particular criminal code provision. Individual provisions of the Model Penal Code and the provisions in the state codes that relied on the Model Penal Code have
significant overlap. For example, an agreement between two persons
2 0 4 conspiracy,2 05
to commit an offense may fall within the solicitation,
attempt,2 0 6 and accessory provisions. 20 7 Statutory provisions on con197 Id.
198 MODEL PENAL CODE

(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
199 LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 141, at 4 § 1.1(b).
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id at 3.
203 Id at 4.
204 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note

205 Id § 5.03.
206 Id. § 5.01.
207 Id. § 2.06.

198,

at § 5.02.
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spiracy2° 8 and burglary 20 9 go far beyond analogous common law provi-

sions. State RICO statutes often allow civil penalties in addition to
2 10
traditional criminal penalties.
Overlap comes as a result of a number of distinct pressures. One
was the pressure to create a code of sufficient breadth so as to permit
convictions without undue complications. The attempt was to avoid
the danger that too much detail causes-the type of "loophole" litigation found in the historical development in the law of theft 21 1 Another pressure came from the practical politics involved at both the
level of the American Law Institute and at the state legislative level.
Professor Louis Schwartz, Reporter for Part II of the Model Code, recalled a debate at the American Law Institute.
The preservation of those definitions of burglary and robbery in the
Model Penal Code.. . was purely a political compromise. We recognize
that you could analyze those things down and abolish robbery and burglary and so on. But we know ourselves what would happen to a proposed code2 that went to the legislature without a specific provision on
21
robbery.
The irrationality of the politics of criminal code revisions can perhaps best be seen in the Arizona Criminal Code. When the Arizona
Legislature adopted its revised Criminal Code, which borrowed heavily from the Model Penal Code, a majority of legislators refused to go
on record as voting for a repeal of any sex offense statutes. In the
Arizona Criminal Code there are two complete sections of statutes
which criminalize certain forms of sexual conduct; the first section is
new and uses Model Penal Code terminology; the second section is
old and is a codification of common law offenses. The new provisions
were intended by the Arizona Law Reform Commission to replace the
2 13
old provisions.
The existence of overlapping provisions, which is inevitable to
some degree, creates power in the office of the prosecutor. Most
states' legislatures, by creating too many policy choices, have effectively abdicated public policy-making to the prosecutor since it is the
prosecutor, and not the legislature, that has the final decision in determining which public policy, if any, is breached by an individual's
conduct. Only in very limited circumstances, such as race discrimina208 Id. § 5.03.

Id. § 221.1.
See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 166.710-.735 (1993).
211 See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, The Model Penal Code's HistoricalAntecedents, 19 RUrERS
209
210

LJ. 521 (1988).
212

Statement by Louis B. Schwartz quoted in Model Penal Code Conference Transcript-Dis-

cussion Two, 19 RUTGFRs LJ. 635, 642 (1988).
213 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1401 to 1416 (1994).

1996]

RECASTING PROSECUTOREAL DISCRETION

tion 214 or vindictiveness, 2 15 will the court overturn a prosecutor's
charging decision. It is clear that this division of authority does not
run counter to federal constitutional requirements.
In United States v. Batchelder,216 the defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Two overlapping provisions of
217
the Omnibus Crime Act of 1968 prohibited the identical conduct.
The defendant was convicted and sentenced under the provisions
which authorized the greater punishment.218 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the ruling of the trial court but remanded the case for resentencing. 2 19 The Seventh Circuit had "serious doubts about the
constitutionality of two statutes that provide different penalties for
identical conduct."220 The Seventh Circuit saw three possible constitutional infirmities. First, the existence of two identical provisions resulted in a lack of fair notice for the defendent and therefore the
statute may be unconstitutionally vague. 22 1 Second, the lack of fair
notice implicated other due process and equal protection concerns
such as "excessive prosecutoial discretion." 222 Third, and most interesting, the existence of two identical statutes "constitutes an impermis223
sible delegation of congressional authority."
In overturning the Seventh Circuit's decisions, the United States
Supreme Court held:
This Court has long recognized that when an act violates more than one
criminal statute, the Government may prosecute under either so long as
it does not discriminate against any class of defendants. Whether to
prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a grand
jury are deci224
sions that generally rest in the prosecutor's discretion.
The Supreme Court refused to characterize the impact of the
dual provisions as empowering "the Government to predetermine ultimate criminal sanctions." 225 In response to the Seventh Circuit's
214 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886). But see Wayte v. United States, 470
U.S. 598, 601-10 (1985):
215 See generally Barbara A. Schwartz, The Limits of ProsecutorialVindictiveness, 69 IowA L.
Rxv. 127 (1983); see also C. Peter Erlinder & David C. Thomas, ProhibitingProsecutorialVindiaiveness hil ProtectingProsecutorial
Discretion: Toward a PrincipledResolution of a Due Process
Dilemma, 76J. CRiM. L. & CnMn.oLoGy 341 (1985).
216 442 U.S. 114 (1979).
217 Id at 115-16.
218 Id.
219 United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626, 636 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 114
(1979).
220 Id. at 633-34.
221 Id. at 631.

222 Id

Id. at 631-34.
224 United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1979) (citations omitted).
223

225 Id. at 125.
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concern that the existence of the "impermissibl[e] delegation to the
Executive Branch the Legislature's responsibility to fix criminal penalties," 226 the Supreme Court commented upon the broad discretion
which resides in the institutions within the criminal justice system:
"t] he provisions at issue plainly demarcate the range of penalties that
prosecutors and judges may seek and impose. In light of that specificity, the power that Congress has delegated to those officials is no
broader than the authority they routinely exercise in enforcing the
227
criminal laws."

The prosecutor also controls the decision of the number of
charges which a defendant will confront.2 28 A prosecutor may decide
to prosecute a defendant for twenty burglaries, ten burglaries, or just
one burglary. A prosecutor may decide to prosecute for conspiracy as
well as for burglary.2 29 The number of charges may affect ajury's perception of the defendant and may ultimately affect the judge's
sentence.
The broad discretion in the charging decision directly impacts
sentencing in those jurisdictions which have mandatory sentencing,
sentencing guidelines, or sentencing statutes with minimum and maximum sentences. By choosing to prosecute a robbery as an "armed
robbery" the trial judge may be forced to sentence a defendant, if
convicted, under a mandatory sentence provision which is applicable
whenever a defendant commits a crime while armed.23 0 Prosecutorial
decisions to charge a violation of a particular statute impacts sentencing in other ways. 23 1 Sentencing enhancement statutes, some of
226 Id. at 125-26.
227 Id. at 126. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 175, § 13.7. at 589-90. Note that the Batchel-

der reasoning presents three major fact patterns in which defendant's conduct may fall
within two statutes. The first category is unobjectionable: a "statute defines a lesser included offense of the other and they carry different penalties .... " The second category is
more objectionable: "where [two] statutes overlap and carry different penalties .... " The
third category, identical statutes with different penalties, is highly objectionable. "There is
nothing at all rational about this statutory scheme .... It confers discretion which is totally
unfettered and which is totally unnecessary.".
228 Id.
229 In manyjurisdictions it is possible for a defendant to be convicted and sentenced for
both conspiracy and the underlying crime. See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 141, § 6.5 (h),
at 567. The Model Penal Code has limited the court's ability to sentence for both. MODEL
PE.N
CODE § 1.07(1)(a) cmt. at 109 (1985).
230 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(c) (West Supp. 1992) (mandatory sentence of
three years or one-third to one-half of total sentence, whichever is greater, for the use or
possession of a firearm in certain offenses). See also Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Underminingthe Effectiveness of Determinate SentencingReform, 81 CAL. L. REv. 61, 6773 (1993) (determinate sentencing reform, which centers on multiple factors for sentencing, is undercut by mandating sentences that often focus on a single factor).
231 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.9 (West 1988). Professor Lowenthal distinguishes
charge-based sentencing and conduct-based sentencing and concludes that charge-based
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which fall into the "three strikes and you're out" category, require that
a sentence be enhanced only if the prosecutor chooses to allege and
prove prior convictions. In some jurisdictions "prior convictions" include multiple convictions during the same trial.23 2 In a less direct
way, the charging decision may later impact a prisoner's attempt for
parole and may even affect the public's perception of the defendant
Indeed the charging decision may impact the defendant's perception
of himself.
There are few areas in which inroads have been made upon the
breadth of the prosecutor's charging decision. In many jurisdictions
the court has the ultimate decision whether to permit a prosecutor to
dismiss charges once the charges have been formally filed.2 3 3 A few

states require a prosecutor to plead under the specific statute as opposed to the more general statute if possible. The West Virginia Code
creates a nondiscretionary obligation to institute criminal proceedings
against persons whom the prosecutor has reason to believe have violated a criminal statute. 23 4 It is not clear what particular impact this
statute has had.23 5 The Colorado Criminal Code permits a person to
challenge the District Attorney's decision not to charge, but the Colosentencing "gives state prosecutors enormous sentencing power because courts can consider leniency only if prosecutors permit it." Lowenthal, supranote 230, at 77.
232 See, e.g., Aiuz. Ray. STAT. ANN § 13-604(F)-(G) (1989); State v. Hannah, 617 P.2d 527
(Ariz. 1980) (a prior felony conviction can be used to enhance punishment even if the
prior conviction is obtained after the commission of the principle offense and when two
offenses are consolidated for trial, one conviction can be used for an enhanced penalty for
the second conviction even though both convictions come in a single trial); see also State v.
Hernandez, 311 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. 1981) (at a trial for separate crimes on three
occasions, convictions of earlier committed crimes can be used to enhance the later
crime); Gotns-Frm, supra note 180, at 15 (describing the California practice of "striking the
priors").
233 At common law, the prosecutor had complete discretion to enter a nolleprosequi. See
Myers v. Frazier, 319 S.E.2d 782, 792 (W. Va. 1984) (noting, however, that this common law
rule was not followed in the Virginias); Wilson v. Renfroe, 91 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1956), cited
with approval in State v. Jackson, 420 So. 2d 320, 321-22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). It has
been estimated that more than 30 states, through statute orjudicial decision, require court
consent to dismiss a charge. United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, Woodruff v. U.S., 425 U.S. 971 (1976), cited with approvalin Myers v. Frazier, 319
S.E.2d 782, 792 n.13 (W. Va. 1984). See generallyEthel R. Alston, Annotation, When is Federal
CourtJustified, UnderRule 48(a) of the FederalRules of CriminalProcedure,In Denying Government
Leave to Dismiss Criminal Charges, 48 A.L.R. FED. 635 (1980). Prior to the formal filing of
charges, the discretion as to which crime to charge lies within the discretion of the prosecution. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text. See also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 180,
at 5 ("[t]he tone has been less one ofjudicial restraint than ofjudicial withdrawal, treating
the prosecutor as so integral and expert a part of the executive branch that he may not be
interfered with by the judiciary").
234 State ex rel. Bailey v. Facemire, 413 S.E.2d 183, 187 (W. Va. 1991).
235 Id. See also State v. Satterfield, 387 S.E.2d 832, 884 (W. Va. 1989) ("the prosecutor's
discretion is not unlimited.... [T]he line of demarcation between prosecutorial duty and
prosecutorial discretion is probable cause.").
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rado Supreme Court has warned that the statute does not permit a
judge to substitute his judgment for that of the prosecutor. The court
must find that the "district attorney's decision was arbitrary or capricious and without reasonable excuse" before the court will step in.23 6
The Oregon Criminal Code, which contains a nonexclusive list of criteria the prosecutor may consider in making plea agreements, 23 7 has
been interpreted as giving prosecutors wide latitude in decision-making-a latitude which seems only to be circumscribed by proof that
the defendant was discriminated against by the prosecutor on the basis that the defendant was a member of a protected class. 23 8 The
Washington Criminal Code lists factors to be considered by prosecutors and police in exercising their discretion.2 39 In a few states, the
State Attorney General has some supervisory control over local
prosecutorial decisions.2 40 But calls to limit prosecutorial discretion
2 41
in the charging decision have fallen on deaf ears.
b.

Plea Bargaining

The charging decision is the basic source of prosecutorial authority, but the power to charge is enhanced by the prosecutor's role in
plea bargaining and by recent trends in sentencing.
The way in which plea bargaining takes place varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Plea bargaining may be explicit or implicit. It
may involve the trial judge or remain a process in which only the prosecutor and defense counsel engage. Prosecutors may bargain with
charge reductions which affect sentencing or may simply agree to
recommend a sentence to the court or remain silent during
2 42
sentencing.
Proponents of plea bargaining generally argue administrative
convenience and efficiency as justifications for the practice. Propo236
237
238
239
240

Landis v. Farrish, 674 P.2d 957, 958 (Colo. 1984).
State v. Buchholtz, 788 P.2d 998, 1000 (Or. 1990).

Id.

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.440 (West Supp. 1996).
See AL~sKA STAT. § 44.23.020 (Supp. 1995); CoNN.GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-275 to 51277 (West 1985'& Supp. 1995); DEL.'CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 2502 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 7:6 (1988); R.I. GEN. Laws § 42-9-1 & 42-9-4 (1993).
241 See, e.g., KENNETH C. DAviS, DISCaREONARvJusncE 224-25 (1969). But cf.Abraham S.
Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth ofjudiial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial"Systems:
France, Italy and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977) (analyzing the prosecutorial process in

three countries, including Germany); cf.John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental CriminalProcedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE LJ. 1549 (1978) (questioning the validity
of the conclusions in the Goldstein & Marcus article). Other suggestions to limit
prosecutorial discretion include the appointment of special prosecutors and permitting
private prosecutions.
242 See HERBERT S. MIUE Er A.., PLEA BARGAINING INTHE UNITED STATES at Y-vii,
Xii-xiv,
xxxix, xl-xli (1978), quoted in SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supranote 175, at 788-91.
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nents point to the guilty plea rate of 90% and conclude that plea bargaining is a simple fact of life.2 43 Other proponents believe plea
244
bargains are more likely than trials to produce an accurate result.

Other proponents see that plea bargaining relieves the uncertainty for
both the prosecutor and the defendant, a good which should not be
underestimated.2 45 ForJudge Easterbrook, prosecutorial discretion in
plea bargaining is simply part of the use of discretion in the criminal
justice system which yields "the order of the market place, coordination of the acts of many thousands of people through a price system.
The features of criminal procedure . . . are best understood as if
designed to facilitate a market assessment and imposition of the price
of crime."

246

Opponents to plea bargaining doubt that plea bargaining always
results in a more efficient 'system 247 and point to experiences in
250 It is
Alaska 248 and El Paso, Texas 249 to support their conclusions.
argued that without plea bargaining, prosecutors would limit the extent of the charges.2 1 Opponents criticize plea bargaining on
grounds of principle as well: plea bargaining gives the prosecutor the
power to be both prosecutor and judge.2 52 In place of plea bargaining, calls have been made for a system ofjury waivers; 2 53 others call for
truncated trials.25 Some call for communities to fund the criminal
245 The classic statement to justify plea bargaining is found in Chief Justice Burger's
opinion in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971):

Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the
process but a highly desirable part for many reasons. It leads to prompt and largely
final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending
trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue
criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between
charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of
the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned.
See also Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Bazelon, J.).
244 LaFAvE & IsRAEL, supra note 175, § 21.1(d).
245 See, eg., People v. Selikoff, 318 N.E.2d 784, 788-89 (N.Y. 1974).
246 Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL SruD. 289,

330 (1983).
247 See, e.g., Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining supra note 4, at 52.
248 See Michael L. Rubenstein & TeresaJ. White, Plea Bargaining:Can Alaska Live Without
It?, 62JuDIcArUR 266, 275-76 (1978).
249 See Robert A. Weninger, The Abolition ofPlea Bargaining:A Case Study ofEl Paso County,
Texas, 35 UCLA L. REv. 265 (1987).
250 But see Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaininglnevitable?, supra note 4, at 1045-46.
251 See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE LJ. 1979
(1992).

252 GOLDSr=I,

supra note 180, at 3-5.

Schulhofer, Is Plea BargainingInevitable?, supra note 4, at 1087-93.
See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the CriminalDefendant'sRight to TriaL Alternatives
to the Plea BargainingSystem, 50 U. Ci. L. REv. 931, 1022-24 (1983).
253
254
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justice system to a degree that would permit the extinguishment of
plea bargaining. 255 For Professor Schulhofer, the analysis in support
of broad discretion in the criminal justice system by Judge Easterbrook misses the hallmark of the criminal justice system: criminal procedure is not a market but rather is a "politicalsystem." 256 For some
opponents of plea bargaining, society's interests-as opposed to the
interests of the prosecutor and the defendants-are compromised un2 57
necessarily by plea bargaining.
Until recent times, opponents of plea bargaining tended to view
it as unnecessarily compromising rights of the defendant. Recently,
however, plea bargaining has come under attack from those who be2 58 Critlieve it has resulted in insufficient punishment for offenders.
ics now include members of the victims' rights movement who have
seen plea bargaining as failing to extractjustice from defendants, i.e.,
2 59
the victim's preferences are not always followed by the prosecutor.
Critics of plea bargaining spearheaded the Proposition 8 reform in
California and successfully campaigned for the "Victims' Bill of
Rights," but the initiative itself has not drastically altered the opera260
tion of plea bargaining.
Calls for the abolition of plea bargaining have been heard and
ignored for more than twenty-five years. For example, the National
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals argued
26 1
that plea bargaining should be prohibited "as soon as possible."
For some, it seemed inevitable that a judiciary which believed the
prosecutor too involved in "the competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime" to judge the sufficiency of a search warrant and required a
judicially held probable cause hearing to justify holding a defendant,
would soon find the need to monitor the use of discretion by the prosecutor.26 2 Although the debate on the merits of plea bargaining will
255 See Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functionsof CriminalProcedure: The Warren and Burger
Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEo. LJ. 185, 221-22 (1983); Alschuler, supra note 254, at
936-69.
256 Schulhofer, CriminalJustice Discretion as a Regulatory System, supranote 4, at 44.
257 See Raymond I. Parnas & Riley J. Atkins, Abolishing Plea Bargaining: A Proposal, 14
CRM.L. BULL. 101 (1978). See also Arenella, supra note 255, at 215-16.
258 CANDACE McCoY, POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING: VIcTIMS' RIGHTS IN CALFORNIA at
xiv-xvi (1993) (listing five reasons why guilty pleas are considered reprehensible by some:
"any sentence less than the full maximum allowed by law must be lenient; the lawyers who
conduct it are unpopular, the worst examples are perceived as normal; it is poorly understood; in popular political debate, crime and justice have become bogeymen . . . [with]
'good guys' and 'bad guys' .....
259 Id. at xv-xvi.
260 Id. at 177-203.
261 NATIONAL ADVISORy COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTIcE STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS,

Standard 3.1 (1973).
262 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 180, at 6-8.
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undoubtedly rage into the next millennium, the likelihood of abandoning the plea bargain is almost non-existent. In fact, in the federal
system, the system of plea bargaining has been given a boost by the
United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines, which provide for a
reduction in the allowable range of sentences from 25% to 30% for an
offender who accepts responsibility for his criminal conduct. One
clear method of accepting responsibility is the plea of guilty.2 63
Although the United States has a long history of plea bargaining,
formal recognition of the important role that plea bargaining plays
has come only in recent times.2 64 The United States Supreme Court
2 65
did not analyze plea bargaining until 1970 in Brady v United States.

After discussing the benefits which plea bargaining has for both the
prosecutor and the defense, the Court concluded:
It is this mutuality of advantage that perhaps explains the fact that at
present well over three-fourths of the criminal convictions in this country rest on pleas of guilty, a great many of them no doubt motivated at
least in part by the hope or assurance of a lesser penalty than might be
imposed if there were a guilty verdict after a trial to judge or jury.26 6
Only a year later, in Santobello v. New York, 2 67 the Supreme Court indicated the passive approach it would take as plea bargaining cases
reached its docket: "'plea bargaining' is an essential component of
the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged." 268 Subsequent decisions indicated that the court was willing to intervene in only the rarest of occasions into the prosecutor's
role in plea bargaining.
Early in the development of the acceptable parameters of plea
bargaining, defendants argued that prosecutorial vindictiveness was
apparent whenever a prosecutor sought more severe punishment after
plea negotiations failed. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes,2 69 the prosecutor

offered to recommend a prison sentence of five years if Hayes pled
guilty. If Hayes did not plead guilty, the prosecutor told Hayes that he
would seek an indictment under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act
which mandated a sentence of life imprisonment. Hayes chose to
plead not guilty. Eventually he was found guilty and sentenced to a
life term.2 70 In upholding Hayes' conviction, Justice Stewart created
the atmosphere in which plea bargaining has been conducted ever
& CAPRA, supra note 175, at 796.
See generally Alschuler, Plea Bargainingand Its Histoy, supra note 4.
397 U.S. 742 (1970).
Id. at 752 (footnote omitted).
404 U.S. 257 (1971).
Id. at 260.

263 See SALTZBURG

264
265
266
267
268

269 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
270 Id. at 358-59.
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since. After first acknowledging that in times past plea bargaining had
occurred as a "clandestine practice," 27 ' Justice Stewart noted the centrality of plea bargaining in the criminal justice process.2 72 The Court
concluded that a plea bargaining promise must be kept.2 73 Earlier in

North Carolinav. Pearce,the Court held that the prosecutor is not permitted to be vindictive in a second trial because the defendant has
successfully attached his first conviction.2 74 But vindictiveness does
not apply, said Justice Stewart, to the "give-and-take negotiation in
plea bargaining." 2' 75 For the Court in Bordenkircher, "there is no such
element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to
2 76
accept or reject the prosecutor's offer."
The Court in Bordenkircherhad the opportunity to mandate active
judicial supervision of the plea bargaining process. In 1978 the jurisprudence of plea bargaining was still sufficiently in its infancy that the
Court could have required a plea bargaining system that placed more
discretion in the trial court and away from the prosecution. The
Court could have decided that a waiver of the myriad trial rights which
a guilty plea requires was not a voluntary or intelligent plea except in
limited circumstances. A broader due process standard than that in
Bordenkirchermight have forbidden any disparity between sentences of
those who plead guilty and those who go to trial. This standard certainly would have cost the prosecutor his most effective tool to per2 77
suade a defendant "to forego his right to plead not guilty."
Instead, the Bordenkirchercourt made it very clear that the role of
the prosecutor was preeminent in the criminal justice system. Only
on rare occasions would an appeals court become involved in overseeing the plea bargaining process.
Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition
of chargeable offenses, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation" so long as the
selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard
such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification .... There is not
doubt that the breadth of discretion that our country's legal system vests
in prosecuting attorneys carries with it the potential for both individual
and institutional abuse. And broad though the discretion may be, there
are undoubtedly constitutional limitations upon its exercise. We hold
only that the course of conduct engaged in by the prosecutor in this
271 Id. at 362.
272 Id. at 361-65.

273 Id. at 365.
274 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969).
275 Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970),
Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. 357, 362-63 (1978).
276 Bordenkircher,434 U.S. at 363.
277 Id. at 364.

cited in United States v.
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case, which no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of foregoing trial or facing charges on which he was
plainly subject to prosecution278
did not violate the Due Process Clause or
the Fourteenth Amendment.

Even the dissenting opinion in Bordenkircheradmitted that the prosecution in the case would be able to reach the same result by filing the
2 79
most serious charges possible before the bargaining process began.
As Justice Blackmun noted, "The courts necessarily have deferred to
the prosecutor's exercise of discretion in initial charging decisions." 280 The dissent also noted that it is the voters who ultimately
decide whether the charging policy followed by the prosecutor is a fair
28

policy.

'

Courts have acknowledged the broad discretion which prosecutors exercise and yet have not assumed judicial review of the exercise
of discretion is either required or advisable. Little has come from
calls from organizations, such as the American Law Institute and the
American Bar Association, for administrative rules as a check on potential abuse of discretion by prosecutors.
c.

Sentencing Reforms

-

A criminal justice system in which prosecutorial discretion consists mainly of charging discretion and plea bargain discretion remains a system in which the prosecutor is the preeminent actor.
However, in those states in which the sentencing powers of the trial
judge have not -been constrained through sentencing guidelines or
sentencing minima, the prosecutor's authority is theoretically subject
to greater control. 282 In practice, the judiciary has generally contented itself with playing a rather passive role in the plea bargaining
process and accepting the bargain struck between the prosecutor and
the defendant 2 8 3 When the courts play a more active role in sentenc278

Md. at 364-65.

279 Id. at 368 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
280 rd.at 368 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
281 Id.

282 See generally Standen, supra note 4, at 1502-05.
283 GoLsmS'
, supra note 180, at 55-56. Goldstein observes:
Judicial resistance to supervision of prosecutorial discretion at any of its several stages
probably stems more from concern about the difficulties of the task than from constitutional doctrine. This is evident in the effect of separation-of-powers considerations
on the outcome of cases. All the leading appellate opinions reverse the trial judge
when he refuses to accept the prosecutor's decision. While upholding the idea of
judicial review, they apply a standard that makes it doubtful that anything but an egregious decision by the prosecutor could properly be disregarded. Their actions reflect
a belief that they are unable, as a practical and a legal matter, to compel the prosecutor to abide by their decision. "Few subjects" said ChiefJustice Warren Burger, then a

circuitjudge, "are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the Executive of
his discretion" in these matters. The point has been repeated often and has led re-
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ing, or when courts have little or no care for uniformity or disparity in
sentencing, the results have triggered accusations that sentences are
overly lenient, perceptions of sentencing disparity caused by the luck
of case assignment, and sentences which appear to be overtly stringent
284
but result in minimal time spent in custody.
By the 1970s the public and its elected representatives began to
rally for sentencing reform which would limit judicial discretion in
sentencing, thereby limiting sentence disparity and forcing guilty defendants to serve longer prison sentences.2 85 The reform movement,
which has influenced both state and federal practices, has been successful on both counts: judicial discretion has been limited and more
persons are now being sentenced to prison for longer periods. Two
important and predictable results have emerged from the reform
movement: increased prosecutorial discretion and overcrowded prisons. Prosecutorial discretion has increased because of the increased
premium placed on the charging decision and the plea bargain decision. Through these decisions, the prosecutor can often dictate the
limited range of judicial discretion allowed by statute or sentencing
guidelines.2 8 6 The increase in prison population due to harsher sentencing guidelines and the increased use of mandatory minimum
sentences by legislatures has resulted in increased capital and operating budgets for corrections agencies and the need to permit early
(and often unsuccessful) release for prisoners in order to comply with
federal court orders or to avoid the likelihood of federal court intervention on overcrowding grounds. 28 7 The "back-and" release by
prison officials, parole boards or through executive clemency fly in
the face of public desire for harsher sentences and "truth-in28 8
sentencing."
Commentators have paid most attention to the federal sentencing guidelines.28 9 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 established the
United States Sentencing Commission which drafted guidelines to become effective on November 1, 1987. Because of constitutional challenges to the guidelines, nationwide application actually began in
formers to minimize the judicial role and to look instead to legislation or to
prosecutorially established guidelines.
284 But see Standen, supra note 4, at 1502-05.
285 See Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Orland, A ConversationAbout Sentencing Commissions
and Guidelines, 64 U. COLO. L. Rlv. 655 (1993).
286 See Standen, supra note 4, at 1505-17.
287 See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
288 See Knapp, supra note 12, at 681-89.
289 Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Reform in the States: An Overview of the ColoradoLaw Review
Symposium, 64 U. COLO. L. RFv. 645, 649 (1993).
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January 1989.290 Criticism of the federal guidelines has been brutal.2 91 As noted by Professor Orland, "Unqualified praise for the U.S.
Sentencing Commission appears to emanate from only one source292
the U.S. Sentencing Commission itself."
By now the main features of the federal guidelines are wellknown. In order to "ensure reasonable uniformity in sentencing by
narrowing wide disparity,"2 93 the 1987 guidelines featured a 258-box
sentencing grid. A base number results from a matrix which includes
the offense level and criminal history level. The base number is then
adjusted by factors including victim characteristics, related uncharged
conduct, and defendant's acceptance of responsibility. The base
number determines the range of sentences which the trial judge may
2 94
impose.
The debate, which both predated and postdated the adoption of
the guidelines, has included lengthy discussions of the role of the
prosecutor in the era of the guidelines. Most commentators believe
the guidelines decrease judicial discretion in sentencing 295 and result
in an "increase in the already swollen power of prosecutors." 296 The
general consensus is that although there has been no definitive study
297 Comto date, guidelines have enlarged prosecutorial discretion.
290 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A
REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SysTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DisPAR-

ITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUToRIAI. DISCRETION AND PLEA BARGAINING 1 (1991) (hereinafter SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT).

291 See supra note 5. See also Albert W. Alschuler, The Failureof Sentencing Guidelines: A
Plea for Less Aggregation, supra note 4 (arguing the unnecessary aggregation of atypical
cases); Andrew von Hirsch &Judith Greene, Mhen Should Reformers Support Creation of Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 329, 334 (1993) ("Not only are the Federal
Commission's guidelines fundamentally flawed in a number of respects, but they also have
made the situation worse than it probably would have been in the guidelines' absence.");
CharlesJ. Ogletree, The Death ofDiscretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101
HAv.L. REv. 1938 (1988) (guidelines fail
to take into account prison overcrowding).
292 Frankel & Orland, supra note 285, at 664. Others have supported the federal sentencing reforms. See, e.g., David W. Yellen, Comment, Two Cheers ForA Tale of Three Cities,
66 S. CAL. L. REv. 567 (1992).
293 SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 290, at 6.
294 SALZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 175, at 1129.
295 See Albert W. Alschuler, Monarch, Lackey, orJudge, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 723 (1993) (a

policy of restrictingjudicial but not prosecutorial discretion is incoherent); Ilene H. Nagel
& Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities:An Emp iricalStudy of Chargingand Bargaining
Practices Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 66 S.CAL. L. REv. 501, 502 (1992) ("when

judicial discretion is constrained, there is an increase in prosecutorial charge bargaining");
Standen, supra note 4, at 1505 ("sentencing guidelines give the prosecutor the power to
establish the parameter of plea bargaining").
296 Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Orland, Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines,70 GEo.
L.J. 225, 234 (1981), cited in Frankel & Orland, supra note 285, at 665.
297 See, e.g., Standen, supra note 4, at 1506. But see'Frankel & Orland, supranote 285, at
666: "Would Guidelines enlarge prosecutorial discretion while constricting the discretion
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missioner Nagel has remarked that "prosecutors circumvent the
guidelines by negotiating pleas to below guidelines sentences in about
25% to 35% of the cases . . . In 20% to 35% of the cases resolved

through a negotiated plea, the prosecutor covertly negotiates a downward departure from the guidelines, [a decision] not subject to appellate review." 298
Professor Alschuler, a longtime foe of plea bargaining, has referred to sentencing under the federal guidelines as "a prosecutor's
paradise." 299 Commentators have concluded that "plea bargaining remains a core unreachable problem that has made substantial inroads
3 0 0 These conin the guidelines' effort to reduce sentence disparity."
clusions are not disproved by studies of the United States Sentencing
Commission.
Sentencing reform in the states began before the federal movement and continues today.3 01 Some commentators have claimed that
state sentencing reform has continued in spite of the federal experience. Indeed in a number of states, sentencing reform became a reality only after legislators and others were assured that the state reform
looked nothing like the federal model. In other states, reform movements were defeated2 by opponents who dragged out the horrors of
30
the federal system.
The studies of the federal scheme, in the words ofJudge Frankel,
allow "[t] he people who always hated plea bargaining and wanted it
"3 3
0 The same is true in the state sentencing
abolished [to] still hate it.
reform efforts. State reforms, which vary both in methodology and
success, have as their centerpiece a narrowing of judicial discretion
of the judges?... The scholarly critics talk as though the answer is now established. But
they do not present very powerful evidence for that conclusion."
298 Letter from Commissioner Ilene H. Nagel to Marvin Frankel (Aug. 3, 1992), cited in
Frankel & Orland, supra note 285, at 669.
299 Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 4, at 926.
300 Frankel & Orland, supra note 288, at 668; but see Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H.
Nagel, NegotiatedPleas Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines: The FirstFifteen Months, 27 AM.
CpM.L. REv. 231, 232 (1989) ("The Guidelines have brought a significant order and consistency to the prosecutorial charging and bargaining decisions that have an effect on
sentencing.").
301 Reitz, supra note 289, at 645-50. See David Boerner, The Role of the Legislaturein Guidelines SentencingIn "The Other Washington," 28 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 381 (1993); Richard S.
Frase, The Role of the Legislature, the Sentencing Commission, and Other Officials Under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FoREsr L. REV. 345 (1993); Laird C. Kirkpatrick,
Mandatory Felony Sentencing Guidelines: The Oregon Mode4 25 U. C. DAvis L REv. 695 (1992)
(comparing state sentencing reform to the federal experience); Schulhofer & Nagel, supra
note 300, at 232 (comparing federal and state guidelines); Ronald F. Wright & Susan P.
Ellis, A ProgressReport on the North CarolinaSentencingand Policy Advisory Commission, 28 WAKE
FoREsr L. Rxv. 421 (1993).
302 Knapp, supra note 12, at 679-81.
303 Frankel & Orland, supranote 285, at 666.
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either through the action of the legislature or the actions of a sentencing commission.3 0 4 In some states the attempt at sentencing reform
has "abolished most discretionary release from prison and developed
typical case offense classifications."30 5 The theory is to transfer discretion at the back-end of the system from parole boards and prison administrators to the front-end and to the judges. Reforms then limit
the front-end discretion of the judges.3 0 6 In practice, the trial judge,
of course, is not the only actor in front-end decision-making.
Through charging and bargaining decisions, particularly in states with
statutory minimum sentences, the prosecutor remains the center of
the decision-making. It is still too early to judge the effectiveness of
state sentencing reforms, although the Minnesota3 07 and Oregon 0 8
attempts at reform seem to be given high marks. But even in the reformed state systems, the prosecutor will continue to play a dominant
role. The flaw in the reformed sentencing statutes remains the fact
thatjudicial sentencing can never move beyond case level accountability and accept system accountability; i.e.,judges worry about individual
cases and are ill-equipped to create a predictable sentencing system in
which resource allocation is a serious issue.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines seem to have increased the
power of the prosecutor, although the issue is not likely to be resolved
for years to come. State reforms, which are not uniform from state to
state, seem to provide a prosecutor with at least as much power as
before the reforms. The push to front-end discretion is beneficial if
the push is intended to relate sentencing to available resources. But it
is the prosecutor, and not the judge, who is in the position to determine how best to use available resources to the best advantage for the
criminal justice system.
C.

CRITIQUES OF THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR

One cannot discuss prosecutorial discretion without inevitably being drawn into the debate concerning the nature of discretion, the
conflict between the due process model and the crime control model
of criminal justice, the role of economic analysis in criminal justice,
and even the legacies of the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts.
The supporters and detractors of prosecutorial discretion all begin
Knapp, supra note 12, at 681-86.
305 Id. at 681.
306 Id. at 684.
307 Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Reform in Minnesota, Ten Years Afler Reflections on Dale G.
Parrent's"StructuringCiminal Sentences: The Evolution of Minnesota's SentencingGuidelines,"75
MrN. L. RE V. 727, 753 (1991).
308 Kirkpatrick, supra note 302, at 712.
304
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with a particular vision of criminal justice which then impacts their
views on charging, bargaining, and sentencing. A few take the position expounded by Professor Weisberg in which he questions whether
the "insular, finely tuned universe of criminal procedure jurisprudence" plays an important role in the political arena of criminal
30 9
justice.
Some supporters of the broad role of prosecutorial discretion do
so from the practical point of view that a system of lessened
prosecutorial discretion would result in a need for heightened resources for the inevitable increase in criminal trials.3 10 Other supporters, such as Judge Easterbrook, see the current state of prosecutorial
discretion as an efficient method of resolving criminal cases and one
in which the efficiency of plea bargaining does not come at the cost of
less accurate determinations of guilt.31 1 Of course for supporters of
plea bargaining this does not mean that the current system is flawless.
For example, Professors Scott and Stuntz have urged reforms to plea
bargaining by referencing lessons learned from the law of contracts. 3 12 Professor Standen has rejected the broader notion of sweeping reforms to limit prosecutorial discretion but concludes that the
federal sentencing guidelines have led to problems of monopsony.
Discretion cannot be eliminated but can be accommodated by dispersing discretion. Judges cannot be bound by the sentencing
3 13
guidelines.
Detractors take many approaches. Some ask the question of Professor Arenella: "Does the process of negotiation where the parties
settle the dispute themselves promote the substantive criminal law's
goals as well as the process of adjudication where a disinterested third
party has the authority to make a binding decision?" 3 14 Some answer
the question along the lines of Professor Schulhofer:
With trials in open court and deserved sentences imposed by a neutral
factfinder, we protect the due process right to an adversarial trial, minimize the risk of unjust conviction of the innocent, and at the same time
further the public interest in effective law enforcement and adequate
punishment of the guilty. But plea negotiations simultaneously undercuts all of these interests 3....
Plea bargaining is a disaster. It can be,
and should be, abolished. 15
309 Robert Weisberg, CriminalProcedureDoctrine: Some Versions on the Skeptical, 76J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 832, 838 (1985).
310 See supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
311 Easterbrook, supra note 246, at 330.
312 Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingas

Contra, 101 YALE LJ. 1909,
1949-66 (1992).
313 Standen, supranote 4, at 1476.
314 Arenella, supra note 255, at 218.
315 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargainingas Disaster,101 YALE LJ. 1979, 2009 (1992).
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Professor Alschuler, a long time critic of prosecutorial discretion, particularly as it manifests in plea bargaining, has argued that plea bargaining is not inevitable and that it is not beyond the financial means
3 16
of the states to abolish the current system of plea bargaining.
Critics of discretion in the prosecutorial charging decision, such
as Professor LaFave, have argued that much of prosecutorial discretion is unnecessary; a reform of substantive criminal law could eliminate some crimes and some statutory overlap.3 17 Some critics of plea
bargaining, such as Professor Davis, have urged a consideration of the
German model of magistrate review as a way to control prosecutorial
discretion.3 18 Some critics of sentencing guidelines, such as Professor
Lowenthal, have urged reconsideration of mandatory minimum sentencing statutes as a way to return a modicum of sentencing discretion
to the sentencing judge.3 19
Sometimes barely concealed in the debate on discretion and its
fine points are what may be the real issues: why does the United States
have a criminal justice system which incarcerates minorities at a disproportionately high rate? Why does the United States have such a
high rate of incarceration? Why do the American people believe the
criminal justice system is too lenient whereas commentators expound
32 0
on the increasing harshness of the system?
Lost in the debate on discretion is the fact that the public, while
not indifferent to the concerns of individual justice, are more sensitive
to the need to stem the tide of crime. Lost in the debate is the fact
that prosecutor and judge have been given very different roles in the
criminal justice system. Courts are uniquely qualified to do justice in
the individual case. The court, by tradition, by training, by resource
allocation, and by procedure must fall toward the end of Professor
Packer's due process model of criminal justice.3 21 Courts are doomed
to march through the docket one case at a time, one defendant at a
time, one victim at a time. Each judge is fated to take the responsibility for each case, for justice falls on only one set of shoulders. Court
attempts to produce broad policy decisions which reach far beyond
316 Alschuler, supra note 254, at 936.
317 LaFave, supra note 4, at 532.
318 DAvis, supra note 241, at 224-25.
319 Lowenthal, supra note 230, at 61.
320 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 295, at 733-34:
Today, after what has probably been the most disastrous decade in the history of
American penology, we continue to wonder whether anyone will address the obvious
problems of the American criminaljustice system-an unwieldy, over-proceduralized
system that threatens ever-more monstrous penalties in order to persuade defendants
to abandon the most basic of their rights.
321 HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 153 (1968). For criticism of
Packer's views, see ArenelIa, supra note 255, at 209-28.
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the facts of the individual case and far beyond its docket, are inherently suspect. On the other hand, Professor Packer's crime control
model, which appears to be the guiding force behind most
prosecutorial decisions, always runs the risk that individual justice may
receive short shrift. And off to the side sits the legislature whose definition of crimes and decisions on sentencing influence the choices
available to both the prosecutor and the judge.
Certainly an overly lenient judiciary can impact crime control
and an overly cynical prosecutor can undermine public perceptions of
individual justice. But it is not helpful to view prosecutors and judges
as vying for the same authority. The judge is first and foremost the
protector of rights in the individual case. The prosecutor is first and
foremost an elected policy-maker whose decisions are meant to impact crime in the community. At times it may be necessary to have the
due process judge determine whether the crime control prosecutor
has overstepped her bounds; but the prosecutor's view regarding allocation and expenditure of resources to impact crime control should
be viewed by the judge as extraordinarily influential, if not controlling. In fact this appears to be the state of the law regarding plea
bargaining.
But simply to acknowledge that the role of the sentencing judge
must primarily focus upon the individual case does not answer the
criticisms of the current state of sentencing law. One theme that can
be distilled from the critics, in the words of Professor Alschuler, is that
"a policy of restricting judicial but not prosecutorial discretion is incoherent." 22 One reason that plea bargaining is perceived as posing a
stumbling block to sentencing reform3 23 is that calls to regularize
prosecutorial discretion have been unsuccessful. The major flaw in
the attempts to limit prosecutorial discretion is increasing procedural
rights for the defendants with the rights to be enforced by the courts.
Leniency by the prosecutor is unlikely to be appealed by either party
and "if appealed, courts are ill-equipped to second-guess refusals to
charge and to assess the provability of unfiled or dismissed
supra note 291, at 723.
See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 300, at 233-34 ("Although it is acknowledged that
plea bargaining poses a major stumbling block to the success of sentencing reform in both
the state and federal systems, few legislative initiatives even addressed this problem.");
Standen, supra note 4, at 1505 ("If the essential condition for the maintenance of market
parameters on plea bargains is the presence of some independent means to control the
bargains of prosecutors, then conceivably, external and independent sentencing guidelines could replace judicial sentencing discretion."); Frankel & Orland, supra note 285, at
668 ("These evaluations suggest that plea bargaining remains a core unreachable problem
that has made substantial inroads in the guideline effort to reduce sentence disparity.").
322 Alschuler,
323
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charges."3 24 It is time to regularize prosecutorial discretion through
the market; a prosecutor with limited resources will use those resources efficiently. If the resources are used inefficiently, the prosecutor will be turned out of office by the electorate.
The issue becomes how can the prosecutor become a more responsible policy-maker for crime control and how can the judge become better at ensuring due process. The second question-the role
of the trial judge in the criminal justice system-has been the source
of much commentary. The public policy role of the prosecutor has
received much less attention and will be the focus of the following
discussion. Some thoughts will be proffered on the intersection of the
two functions.

IV. THE PROPOSAL
A.

THE PARAMETERS OF CHANGE: WHAT IS LIKELY TO CHANGE AND
WHAT IS NOT

The American criminal justice system does not respond well to
suggestions for fundamental change. For example, calls to limit
prosecutorial discretion by the interposition of a charging magistrate
have fallen on totally deaf ears. 25 Even calls for more active control
of prosecutorial discretion through rule-making have made little
headway. 32 6 One cannot simply ignore history, tradition and practical
politics when suggesting change.
If change were ever easy, one would never be forced to settle for a
middle ground. If one looked at the current system and decided that
crime had become an evil that refused to contain itself within the arbitrariness of state and local boundaries, one could call for the elimination of state control of criminaljustice and place the responsibility for
investigation, prosecution, and punishment in the hands of the federal government. One would argue that the United States Attorney
General with control over the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
United States Federal Attorneys, and the Bureau of Prisons is the only
official able to create a uniform, national policy of crime control.
Such a proposal has a certain appeal for a few, and in fact is an extension of the current trend toward the "federalization" of crime enforcement;3 27 but such a proposal has no hope of enactment At the other
end of the spectrum, it seems unlikely that crime will ever be a totally
localized evil. The great number of local jurisdictions have neither
324
325
326
327

Frase, supra note 301, at 375.
DAvis, supra note 241, at 224-25.
See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
See, LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 175, § 1.2(a) at 2.
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the need nor the resources to be totally autonomous with particular
regard to investigation and punishment. There is no trend to localizing prisons despite the fact that county jails often feel the brunt of
state prison overcrowding. County jails become backlogged before
prisoners are released. Even a suggestion that the local prosecutor
should have administrative supervision over local police agencies
would require the elimination of the elected office of sheriff or the
transfer of the office of police chief away from city councils to the
office of local prosecutor. 328 These changes are not likely to occur in
the near future.
To argue effectively for change, one must first identify what
needs to be changed and yet admit that which is unlikely to be
changed. What must be changed? Prosecutors must make decisions
which take into account finite prison resources. From the prosecutors' perspective, current prison funding practices create effectively
unlimited prison budgets. Prosecutors simply continue to prosecute
individuals despite whether the level of imprisonment will force the
state prison to spend more money than its budget permits. From the
legislative perspective, the current prison funding practice takes from
the legislature the ability to balance competing funding requests
against demands of the prison system. Prosecutors must set enforcement priorities to make the best use of limited resources and must be
bound by those decisions. Legislatures must be able to make funding
choices at the start of the fiscal year that will not be in need of dramatic overhaul as the fiscal year proceeds.
What else must be changed? Prosecutors do not face intensive
review by either the court or the electorate or any other medium. As
noted above, courts are not equipped to make the type of broad enforcement choices which prosecutors currently make. The current
dispersal of responsibility does not permit the electorate to look to
one elected official for leadership in crime enforcement. If prosecutors were responsible to the electorate for the effective use of resources to fight and punish crime, the electorate would be better
informed and better able to exercise review of the actions of the prosecutor. Change is needed to force prosecutors to accept this responsibility and change is needed in data gathering so that the prosecutor
and the electorate can better determine whether established
prosecutorial policies best reflect local values. With the necessity of
establishing enforcement priorities will come the impetus to draft
328 See, e.g., Patricia Nelson, Town Cooperation Gets a Push, BOSTON GLOBE, March 24,

1995, at 1 (the 351 independent towns and cities in Massachusetts cause problems for
police coordination).
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concrete guidelines to govern prosecutorial decision-making. Looking to the prosecutor for leadership in crime control is consistent with
3 29
the history of law enforcement in the United States.
Prosecutors currently have few incentives to assist in the development of crime prevention programs or to participate in the use of
alternative sanctions. Change is needed to encourage prosecutors to
become involved in alternative programs and to convince the electorate that the alternative programs are effective and have a proper part
to play in an overall program of crime enforcement.
Public perception that the criminal justice system is meant to be
manipulated for personal gain must be changed. The public perception is that plea bargaining assists everyone-the prosecutor, the defendant, the judge, and defense counsel-except the interests of the
public.3 30 It is to be hoped that public confidence can come from a
commitment by the prosecutor to create enforcement policies in an
open environment and then to follow those policies. The commitment to firmness includes a shift to front-end discretion. The "truthin-sentencing" movement in the states may be criticized as being naive
and no more effective than discretion exercised by parole boards or
other agencies with discretion to release prisoners, but public confidence building calls for sentences which will be served. 3 3 ' If longer
sentences are demanded by the public, it must be understood that
longer sentences do not come cheaply.
In order to accomplish changes in prosecutorial responsibility for
the effective use of limited prison resources, meaningful review of
prosecutorial discretion by the electorate, the creation of written
guidelines, prosecutorial participation in alternative sentencing programs, and the emergence of public confidence in the criminal justice
system, there must also be an awareness of what is unlikely to change.
The preeminent role of the prosecutor in the criminal justice system is unlikely to change.3 3 2 The temper of the times calls for the
reduction ofjudicial involvement in broad policy-making.3 3 3 The history of the office of prosecutors,3 3 4 the constitutional direction of the
United States Supreme Court in cases, such as Batchedei 3a 5 and
Bordenkircher,33 6 and the elected nature of the office of prosecutor all
See supra part IHAL.
See, e.g., McCoy, supra note 258.
See supra note 12.
332 SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 175, at 798.
333 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2054 (1995).
334 See supra part IAL.
335 See supra notes 216-27 and accompanying text.
336 See supra notes 268-80 and accompanying text.
329
330
331
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point to a continued expansive role for the prosecutor. Even if the
trends toward mandatory sentencing and sentencing guidelines were
to end at the state level, the role of the prosecutor would still be
secure.
Local control over crime policy is unlikely to change. Despite the
increase in the rate of multi-jurisdictional crimes and the increase in
sophisticated crimes such as computer crime and international banking crimes, there has been no attempt to move the criminal justice
system away from control by locally elected officials. Well founded
objections to the idea of an elected prosecutor have been voiced for
many years without apparent impact. The movement toward appointed judges, non-partisan selected judges, orjudges appointed and
then subject to a vote of retention (the "Missouri Plan") have not
33 7
found analogous developments in the election of local prosecutors.
Local control of crime policy means that there will continue to exist
both very large and very small prosecutors' offices. Local control
means that proposals for change must account for the idiosyncracies
of size, sophistication and style found among prosecutor offices.
Funding of prosecutors' offices by local agencies and funding of
prisons by state government is not likely to change. Many local jurisdictions find jail budgets stretched to their limits by the increased
level of crime and by the back-up of convicted prisoners whose transportation to a state facility is temporarily blocked by the overcrowding
at the state institution.3 3 8 Absent large block grants from the state to
the local governmental unit, or absent the creation of new revenue
sources, it seems unlikely that local government can accept fiscal responsibility from the state for the punishment of prisoners. For most
local jurisdictions, the housing of long-term prisoners by the local jurisdiction would be uneconomical.
B.

HALLMARKS FOR CHANGE: A PROPOSAL

Because of the great variations in the size, funding, management,
and traditions in prosecutors' offices, it is impossible to create a proposal ready-made to serve all jurisdictions. However, certain
hallmarks for change can be discerned.
1.

Linking Discretion to Resources

Prosecutorial discretion must be linked directly to the availability
337 For a discussion of the Missouri Plan, see Laurence Baum, Voters' Information injudi-

cial Elections: The 1986 Contestsfor the Ohio Supreme Cour 77 Ky. LJ. 645 (1988).
338 See BuREAu OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 5.
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of prison resources. One way to create the link3 3 9 is for the legislature
to nominate an existing agency or create a separate agency with the
following tasks: to inventory the current level of available prison space;
to document the prospects for supervised releases; to determine the
prison and release supervision needs for each county; and to provide
research for the legislature and for the electorate on the effectiveness
of the criminal justice system on a state-wide and county-wide basis.
During the first year of its existence, the agency would determine
the capacity of current prisons. The capacity of the state's prisons cannot be determined by simply listing current beds, but also must take
into account the staffing needs. The temptation for the legislature
will be to place as many prisoners as it can into its current prisons. A
determination of prison capacity will not be made without controversy; there are no absolute standards to apply. The capacity of the
prison would also be affected by any existing state or federal court
orders. The agency would not require that a prison have certain educational or vocational programs save those programs such as health
cafe which may be required by federal or state constitutional or statutory requirements. Again, during the first year a major task of the
agency will be to hire research staff and create data bases. In order to
allocate resources effectively to the local jurisdictions, the allocation
agency must consider such factors as population trends, probation
and other supervision, unemployment, past crime data, and educational statistics that might impact the level of criminal activity within a
jurisdiction. Once the state legislature determines the resources available for the next fiscal year, the allocation agency must make a tentative distribution of resources. Each prosecutor would be given ample
time to comment upon the method of allocation, the level of allocated resources, and the effect the level of resources would have upon
prosecutorial decisions.
2.

RequiringProsecutorialGuidelines

Prosecutors must create a plan which details how finite resources
will be used. Since the day-to-day use of resources is a local decision to
be made by the local prosecutor, it is up to the prosecutor to take her
intimate knowledge of local conditions and to devise a plan to combat
339

Other ways exist to link prosecutorial discretion to resource availability. One could

give block grants to the county to purchase all its prison needs. Such a system would
privatize prisons and create competition. One could propose that all sentences are provisional until the end of the fiscal year when sentences would become fixed in light of available resources. Both these suggestions require change at such a fundamental level as to be
impractical. For similar reasons it does not seem practical to suggest that all states revert to
the federal model of criminal justice administration with the state attorney general supervising all prosecutions and control over prisons.
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crime within the local jurisdiction. The proposal retains the centrality
of the prosecutor in the criminal justice system but requires that the
prosecutor identify goals and work toward those goals within a limited
budget. The efficacy of the prosecutor's local plan will be audited by
the state allocation agency, and armed with the information provided
by the allocation agency, the electorate will better be able to review
the prosecutor's effectiveness and compare the prosecutor's strategy
to the strategy of any political challenger.
Local prosecutors would be required to devise a strategy for prosecution within the local jurisdiction. The prosecutor would set out
her philosophy of enforcement. She would determine for which
crimes deterrence is a major issue. If the prosecutor eschews a utilitarian view of punishment and links punishment to purely retributive
purposes, she must determine the punishment that is deserved for
designated criminal acts. If the prosecutor sees incarceration as basically a means to isolate the prisoner from society, she must determine
the degree of isolation that can be afforded. The prosecutor should
also announce the discounts available for cooperation and guilty
pleas. Given the degree of discretion that a prosecutor has regarding
charging decisions (and therefore the direct impact a prosecutor has
upon sentencing) it is unacceptable for a prosecutor to claim that the
degree of retribution deserved is the maximum penalty permitted by
the legislature. Although this response may be constitutionally sufficient under United States v. Batchelder,3 40 it is unlikely that a prosecutor
would have resources to take this position in every prosecution. It is
possible that a prosecutor would create a charging matrix which
might appear to be similar to matrices in sentencing guidelines except
that the starting point on the matrix would be an actual event rather
than a particular crime. As discussed above, to approach sentencing
from the starting point of a particular crime already assumes a judgment about the culpability of the particular defendant rather than the
severity of the act itself. Currently, a judge constrained by sentencing
guidelines may consider the nature of the underlying act and the
character of the defendant only after the range of discretion has been
limited by the crime charged. There may be other ways in which the
prosecutor might set out charging and bargaining guidelines, including reference to descriptions of common cases or a listing of factors
that must be considered when charging. A consistent policy of charging and bargaining presumes a level of administrative control within
the prosecutor's office which may not currently exist.
All sentences meted out to defendants within the local jurisdic340 442 U.S. 114 (1979).
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tion would be chargeable against the prosecutor's allocation. The
prosecutor would be forced to be conscious of available resources at
every stage of the proceedings. Resource allocation questions would
exist when the prosecutor decides to proceed with an investigation,
proceed with formal charges, propose a diversion program, offer a
plea bargain, or recommend a sentence to the court. Resource allocation issues would be present when a decision is made to seek extradition of a defendant from another state, or whether to defer to a
federal prosecution. It is possible that the proposal, for perhaps the
first time, encourages prosecutors, if they are to err, to err on the side
of lesser punishments. But even this projection may well be wrong: a
prosecutor might find that a very severe charging policy at the least
encourages more plea bargains and, at the most, has a greater deterrent impact upon potential offenders.
The requirements of the proposal do not place unrealistic demands upon either large or small prosecution offices. The main requirement is that prosecutors are required to state in advance how the
exercise of discretion will be structured. In the past, prosecutors have
rarely created rules for self-regulation of discretion despite (or perhaps because of) the calls for regulation by commentators. But by
linking the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to the availability of
resources, the prosecutor, for the first time, needs the prosecutorial
guidelines as managerial tools. It would be in a prosecutor's self-interest to set out prosecutorial policy in detail. For smaller prosecutors'
offices, it may be necessary or convenient for offices to cooperate with
one another to draft prosecutorial guidelines. The allocation agency
may also serve as a resource for the guidelines effort.
Two very serious issues regarding prosecutorial guidelines remain. First, should prosecutors be bound to follow state or county
rule-making procedures when creating guidelines? Second, will the
guidelines create rights in the accused? Since one goal of this proposal is to create more public awareness and review of the actions of the
prosecutor, an open rule-making process is necessary. There is no
reason to believe that the rules created by the prosecutor are inherently less susceptible to an open process than other agencies.
Whether state rulemaking procedures are the best way to guarantee
openness is an issue for each state legislature. Unless an accused can
prove discrimination in charging and prosecuting based upon an unacceptable criterion such as race or gender, the prosecutorial guidelines should not serve as a basis for attack. Failure of the prosecutor
to follow her own guidelines is a political issue for the electorate. This
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approach retains the current law of Batchelder.34
3. EncouragingProsecutorParticipationin Crime Control and
Sentencing Alternatives
The proposal attempts to provide the prosecutor with incentives
to exercise discretion in a predictable manner. From a personal perspective, the prosecutor who is the best policy-maker and policy-enforcer should be reelected. From an institutional point of view, the
state must find a way to reward those counties which can control
crime and thereby use a disproportionately low level of prison resources. Prosecutors should attempt to use programs of alternative
sentencing and crime prevention. It may be necessary for the state to
allocate "savings" to the county for use in programs such as education,
which arguably have tangential impact upon the crime rate. But there
is a serious problem that must be confronted: many crime prevention
programs may not bear fruit for a lengthy period of time. There is no
singular way to approach this issue, which is really no different than
similar policy issues, such as funding for school lunch programs. Public education, awareness, and common sense may be the only antidotes to short term thinking. On the other hand,, prosecutors who
insist on prison resources which go beyond the routine allocation may
have to use county resources to purchase space out-of-state or use
county jail facilities for housing convicted felons. Both of these alternatives may be improper under state law and, at the very least, might
cause serious practical problems.
4.

Collecting and Analyzing CriminalJustice Information

If the electorate is to become more responsible reviewers of
prosecutorial conduct, they will need hard data of the prosecutor's
accomplishments during her term. If the prosecutor is to receive an
appropriate allocation of resources, and if the allocation agency is to
treatjurisdictions fairly, criminal justice information must be well-collected and expertly analyzed3 4 2 But the proposal and its record keeping requirement will also assist the state legislature in its policy341 Id.
342 See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7:40 (1988):
7:40 STATIsncAL ANA.Ysis CENTER. There shall be a statistical analysis center under

the supervision of the attorney general. The center shall provide complete, accurate,
and current criminal and juvenile justice statistics to public officials and law enforcement operational, managerial, and planning personnel. The attorney general shall
oversee and coordinate the work of the center in maintaining, coordinating, and improving the state criminal and juvenile justice statistics system; analyzing and publishing criminal justice data; and supervising the management and administrative statistics
program.
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making. After reviewing the research that will flow from the reporting
and predicting activities of the allocation agency, the legislature can
make a reasoned decision in its choice to slight one program to benefit another. If the legislature concludes that prosecutors are too lenient or too strict in an area of crime, the legislature can impose
sentencing minima or maxima or narrow the available range. If it
appears that certain crimes are underused or overused by prosecutors,
changes in the statutory definitions of crime can be proposed. If certain prosecutorial policies appear to have a greater impact than
others, the legislature can mandate that the program be used
throughout the entire state.
Information will also assist in the difficult task of coordinating the
various offices involved in crime prevention, prosecution, and punishment. Information which might indicate the weaknesses and
strengths of prosecutorial policy may also shed light on police policy.
5. Restating the Role of the Trial Court
The role of the trial court must remain, as it is now, as the guarantor of individual justice. It would be very surprising if the current
role of the trial court changed a great deal under this proposal.
Courts will be no more constrained in their discretion than they are
now. Depending upon implementing legislation, it may be that courts
will be asked to ensure that each defendant is sentenced consistent
with the prosecutor's guidelines. Again, it is the prosecutor who must
set enforcement policy and determine how best to use available resources; but it is the court which guarantees thatjustice is done in the
individual sentence before it.
6. Providingfor the Unexpected
Crime is not entirely predictable. For example, a small rural
county might find itself with a prosecution of a large drug conspiracy
which has centered itself within the jurisdiction. Within the proposal
there must be an emergency provision whereby a local jurisdiction
may seek prison resources beyond its allocation. In other areas, such
as the Federal Speedy Trial Act, emergency provisions are included to
cope with the unusual. 3 43 The danger is that the claims of the unusual become too usual. At that point, the system returns to one in
which the prosecutor no longer has a stake in the efficient use of finite resources. Injurisdictions with large caseloads, it is less likely that
one set of events will disrupt the prosecutor's avowed strategy.
Despite the problems of "back-end" discretion, it may be that in a
343 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (8) (1994) (interest ofjustice exception).
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true emergency situation, very selected use of "back-end" discretion
may be at least a partial and very unusual solution.
Exempting certain crimes such as murder from the allocation system is one way to avoid the difficulty of providing for the unexpected
situation. Although the predictability of the murder rate and the relative small numbers of murders are not likely to cause dire problems, it
may be helpful in commanding public confidence that the public
knows that certain crimes are outside the allocation.
7.

Creating a Process for Change

As prosecutors become more actively involved in crime prevention, sentencing alternatives, and data collection and analysis, a better
understanding of the operation of the entire criminal justice system
will emerge. It is difficult, of course, to predict what will be learned.
It may be that we learn that crime rates are unresponsive to either
harsher sentences or prevention programs. It may be that we learn
that local prosecutors are incapable of accepting the role of chief policy-maker on criminal justice matters. Some states may learn that local officials are willing and able to be effective policy-makers while
other states may find that complicated functions such as crime control
and detection are best handled at the state level.
This proposal advocates for the creation of an atmosphere of constant change and constant evaluation.
C.

OBSTACLES TO CHANGE: PRACTICAL AND OTHERWISE

No one proposal can be tailor-made for all states and all counties.
The previous section suggests the main characteristics that an individual plan for linking prosecutorial discretion to the availability of resources should contain. This section is concerned with the main
obstacles that any plan is likely to encounter.
The first set of obstacles centers on the office of the prosecutor.
Since approximately twelve percent of prosecutor offices currently
have written prosecutorial guidelines,3 44 why should we believe that
prosecutors will draft new guidelines? The easy response is that prosecutors will be directed by legislation to draft guidelines. In addition,
prosecutors will see that it is in their best interest to be seen formally
as the chief criminal justice personage in the jurisdiction and guidelines are the price to pay. Similarly, past reluctance of some prosecutors to participate in criminal justice data and analysis will hopefully
give way to the necessity to use resources more efficiently. It should be
noted that the federal sentencing guidelines have operated, in some
344 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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ways, as a set of prosecutorial guidelines, and as Schulhofer and Nagel
have reported, the sentencing guidelines have brought a degree of
consistency to plea bargaining in the federal system.3 45
The office of the prosecutor presents some other obstacles to
change. Since many prosecuting offices have fewer than ten employees, 346 many will not have the personnel to create guidelines and ana3 47
lyze data. In addition, personnel turnover in some offices is high
and in some offices the prosecutor is only a part-time official. 348 The
statewide allocation agency should be seen as a clearinghouse and resource center for local prosecutors in assisting with compliance.
Another set of obstacles centers on the political nature of the office of prosecutor. There is a danger when crime policy is controlled
locally that the prosecutor will act unfairly or feel undue pressure because of political ties. The simple fact is that this is our current system. There is no reason to believe political pressures would be worse
under the proposal. In fact, current prosecutorial discretion is virtually unlimited; under the proposal, the use of discretion will be tempered by the availability of resources. Closely related to this obstacle is
the broader objection that the prosecutor will do what is politically
expedient. We have chosen to put the prosecutor in the midst of politics and in doing so we have chosen to interpret her motive not as
"What do I do to be re-elected?", but as "How do I operate my office
so as to respond to the desires of my community?" What the proposal
does is give the electorate better information by which to judge the
prosecutor's effectiveness. If the prosecutor always opts for a short
term solution, this can be a point of contention in re-election. If the
electorate wishes to choose short term responses over long term responses to crime, this is the choice of the voters.
It is conceivable that at election time the prosecutor will blame an
unsuccessful tenure on the failure of the legislature to provide adequate resources or the failure of the police to detect crime. Detection
is generally police work and the police are not supervised by the prosecutor. Like many crime prevention issues, the focus will be on the
benefit of short term versus long term thinking. This is quintessentially a political issue. If the electorate is willing to pay for more expensive but more immediate solutions, it can make the choice. A well
conceived policy of crime prevention must compete in the political
arena for approyal. A well informed electorate is all that can be
hoped for. At the least, under the proposal, the prosecutor will have a
,45 Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 300, at 286.
346 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
347 BuREAu OFJUSMCE STATISTICS, supranote 7, at 3.
348 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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greater incentive than that which currently exists to work cooperatively with other segments of the criminal justice system.
It is also conceivable that a prosecutor will attempt to evade the
spirit of the proposal with rhetoric about the need to punish all the
defendants to the absolute limit. Under the proposal, this is a fair
debate for the voters. If the voters wish to prosecute beyond the level
of resources allocated by the state, the county can prosecute at the
heightened level if it is willing to bear the additional costs. The fiscal
debate becomes one involving the prosecutor and the local county
board of supervisors.
In addition, the proposal gives the legislature the opportunity to
recapture control over its own budget. It also gives the legislature the
ability to take back the operation of its prisons from the federal courts
where the source of federal intervention has been the overall lack of
state resources. The legislature would have better information so that
it can alter the amount of resources or amend the criminal code if
necessary.
Two areas of concern remain for the legislature. The first is that
the state legislature will cap prison budgets but permit prosecutorial
discretion to continue to increase incarceration rates. Increased information should make state legislatures more effective and more responsible policy-makers. If state legislatures shirk their duties
regarding prison resources, federal courts may still intervene. The debate on prosecutorial discretion and the availability of resources is
fundamentally a political debate, but it is a debate set in the context of
the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment.
The second concern in the legislative area centers on the impact
of local control upon statewide uniformity of enforcement. Currently
local prosecutors determine which crimes will take priority. The proposal simply makes this fact more public. But if the legislature believes that certain crimes should be enforced on a statewide basis, it
may find methods to accomplish this goal. For example, if a legislature fears that freedom of expression would fall victim to local control
over prosecution, the legislature, where it is legally possible to do so,
might give enforcement of pornography laws to the state attorney general. Other measures, such as mandatory sentences, might achieve
some degree of uniformity even though the prosecutor still retains a
great deal of discretion in states with mandatory sentencing
provisions.
Prosecutors in state systems have been elected officials for most
our history. With crime a problem of serious interest to voters, it
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seems a bit ironic that one obstacle to the implementation of the proposal may be voter apathy. Do voters care enough to educate themselves on the record of the prosecutor? Currently, responsibility for
criminal justice issues is so dispersed as to limit the ability of the voters
to look to the prosecutor for leadership. Once the leadership is established, and once the data has been gathered on the prosecutor's record, the state should determine whether the review by the electorate is
being taken seriously. If the review role of the electorate is not effective, state consideration of an appointed public prosecutor system or
other alternatives should occur.
For some critics, the underlying problem in the American criminal justice system is the overzealous use of prison as a punishment.
For these critics, any change which will not result in less use of incarceration is doomed to failure. Yet there is no assurance that this proposal will result in less use of imprisonment as a punishment. On the
one hand, the percentage of state budgets actually dedicated to incarceration is low when compared to other expenditures such as education. On the other hand, states are finding it difficult to free up
discretionary funds to enlarge further state prison systems. The proposal asks the political questioh of the voters: how much incarceration
are you willing to afford?
Another obstacle to change is that by publicizing prosecuting priorities, some persons may be educated as to the actual rate of detection and punishment. It is not unusual for the public to overestimate
the chance of detection and the severity of punishment; 349 the problem is substantially no different than what currently exists. However,
the chance that certain criminal conduct might actually be encouraged by public awareness is outweighed by the voters' need to
review the prosecutor's performance.
Practical problems concerning multi-jurisdictional crimes can be
solved by the allocation agency. Other problems, such as crime that
occurs near the end of the fiscal year, can be met with some imagination. If the county is rewarded when the prosecutor uses less than the
annual allocation, there is less incentive for a prosecutor to go on a
"sentencing binge" at the end of the year. If the prosecutor is faced
with an increase in crime at year's end, either the rise in year-end
crime is an annual phenomenon for which there can be planning or
the rise in crime presents an emergency situation for which the prosecutor should be able to "borrow" within limits for the next year's allocation. Such practical issues can be resolved with experience, but
prosecutors must realize that priority setting and planning are serious
349 NIGEL WALKER, SENTENCING IN A RATIONAL

SocIEw 86-87 (1st American ed. 1971).
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objectives which should not be lightly regarded.
The final obstacle in implementation is a problem endemic to all
criminal justice research: how does one measure success? Rarely in
criminal justice research is there a situation which creates a controlled
experiment.35 0 Rarely can one isolate one or more factors and say
conclusively that these factors have caused a change in conduct. Perhaps the most obvious example of the difficulty in criminal justice research comes when one attempts to use recidivism rates to judge a
program's effectiveness.8 5 ' Difficulty in interpretation of data is not
an excuse for refusing to collect and analyze data. As the criminal
justice system collects more data and as the public becomes more involved in the review function, sophistication by the analysts and by the
voters will improve.
V.

CONCLUSION

There is little doubt that the prosecutor plays a pivotal role in the
criminal justice system. Through charging decisions, plea bargains,
and sentence recommendations, the prosecutor sets enforcement policy for her jurisdiction. She is not, however, forced to face the full
cost of prosecutorial decisions. In the vast majority of jurisdictions,
the cost of prosecution is borne by the county, whereas prison costs
are the state's fiscal responsibility.
One result of this "split-funding" practice is a system in which no
one public official can be held responsible for the successes or failures
of law enforcement. In the current system, the prosecutor has every
reason to prosecute to the fullest, has no incentive to become an active participant in crime control programs, and has no incentive to
draft prosecutorial guidelines. The current system also creates an environment in which the electorate cannot effectively monitor the actions of the prosecutor.
Most attempts to monitor, regularize, or constrain prosecutorial
discretion seek to do so by means of greater judicial oversight. These
attempts have failed because they intend to place greater policy-making functions with the judiciary. Prosecutors should remain the chief
policy-maker in a criminal justice system which historically has preferred local control of crime enforcement. To make the prosecutor a
more responsible policy-maker, and to make the prosecutor more accountable to the voters, the prosecutor must be held accountable for
the effective use of limited prison resources. To achieve this end, a
state agency should be created to allocate prison resources fairly
850 Id. at 92-93.
351 NIGEL WALKER, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BRITAIN 242-60 (rev. ed. 1968).
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among local counties. Based on the allocation, prosecutors must create enforcement policies which set out prosecutorial priorities. If
fewer prison resources are used than were allocated, the local county
should receive a windfall. If the prosecutor needs additional resources, the county should provide the additional funds except in
emergency situations. Over time the allocation agency will be able to
collect data which will assist prosecutors in setting enforcement policy
as well as assist the electorate in its decision to retain or dismiss the
incumbent prosecutor.

